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ABSTRACT
Cryptographic functions and encryption schemes for images and 3D objects
Esam Elsheh, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2011
One great challenge in data security is to design computationally efﬁcient cryptographic
algorithms and protocols that are necessary to keep systems secure, particularly when com-
municating through untrusted networks such as the Internet. Cryptography is a hierarchical
science that can be divided into several sub-layers. At the highest layer, cryptographic pro-
tocols are used to provide security in various applications such as online banking, remote
login and secure e-mail. These protocols rely on cryptographic algorithms to achieve their
required security objectives. At the lowest level of this hierarchy, we have the components
that are used to build these cryptographic algorithms.
The ﬁrst problem addressed in this thesis is the design of cryptographic functions which
are the basic building blocks of symmetric key primitives. We introduce a new measure for
the cryptographic functions strength called nonlinearity-proﬁle. We identify the existence
of the linear structure in the class of rotation symmetric Boolean functions. Motivated by
the better cryptographic bounds that can be achieved by functions over GF (p), p > 2, we
extend various cryptographic ideas from GF (2) to the GF (p) case.
Several attempts were made to construct public key cryptosystems based on trapdoor
Boolean permutations that can be implemented efﬁciently. In this thesis, we analyze the
security of one of the proposed cryptosystem based on Boolean permutations. In particular,
we show that the construction suggested by Wu and Varadharajan is insecure by presenting
an efﬁcient cryptanalytic attack that allows the cryptanalyst to invert this class of Boolean
permutations without the knowledge of the secret key parameters.
The rest of the thesis is devoted to the analysis and design of various cryptographic
algorithms for image processing and 3D graphics. We show that image encryption schemes
iii
based on parameterized discrete transforms represent typical examples of insecure ciphers.
All the building blocks of these schemes are linear, and hence, breaking these scheme
using a known plaintext attack is equivalent to solving a set of linear equations. We also
invalidate the argument of relying on the visual quality of the encrypted image ciphertext
by providing an experimental result for a trivially insecure system that produces ciphertext
images with the same property.
In various applications, such as military documents and sensitive business data, the ne-
cessity of keeping these documents secret and safe must be ﬁrmly assured. In recent years,
digital multimedia elements such as 2D images and 3D models have been considered as
important as any other text sensitive information, and several image protection techniques
have been proposed to assure the security of secret images. We show that the matrix-based
secret image sharing scheme proposed by M. Rey is not ideal for practical usage due to the
fact any participant in the scheme can recover the original image without the need to com-
bine his/her share with any other participant. We also propose a geometric framework for
3D secret sharing. To decrease the amount of the information that must be kept secret, we
use two lossless data compression algorithms, Huffman Coding and ZLIB, prior to splitting
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Recent advances in computer technology have contributed to the emergence of data pro-
tection and the need to communicate information without the fear of being intercepted by
unintended recipients. To achieve this objective, the information is encoded in such a way
that the intended receiver is the only one who can retrieve its contents. This process has
developed into the science of cryptography. The encoding technique has been termed en-
cryption, which is the transformation of the original data into a form that is unreadable
without the appropriate secret knowledge. The development of cryptography has been par-
alleled by the development of cryptanalysis, the art and science of how to compromise such
cryptographic systems.
This chapter contains problems deﬁnition, motivation, objectives, and a brief review of
essential concepts and deﬁnitions which we will refer to throughout the thesis. We also
present a short summary of material relevant to cryptography and multimedia security.
1
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1.1 Problems deﬁnition
Cryptography [1] is a hierarchical science that may be divided into several sub-layers. At
the highest layer, cryptographic protocols are used to provide security in various applica-
tions such as online banking, remote login and secure e-mail. These protocols rely on cryp-
tographic algorithms to convey these messages securely. In other words, cryptographic al-
gorithms can be considered as the core for these cryptographic protocols. These algorithms
perform the mathematical transformations to provide data protection. Examples for these
algorithms are the RSA [2] public key system and the Advanced Encryption (AES) [3] sym-
metric key algorithm. At the lowest level of this hierarchy, we have the components that are
used to build these cryptographic algorithms. In the case of symmetric key algorithms such
as block ciphers, stream ciphers and hash functions, Boolean functions and S-boxes repre-
sent these primitive components. Since the security of the cryptographic algorithms depend
on these Boolean functions building blocks, one can argue that the overall system security
also depends on these primitives. In this thesis, we systematically study various aspects of
this hierarchy starting from the primitive components to the cryptographic applications for
delivering a secure text and multimedia contents.
1.1.1 Properties of cryptographic functions
Symmetric key primitives, including block cipher, stream ciphers and hash functions, are
used to secure many applications such as mobile phones, smart cards, Internet and wireless
communications, and multimedia applications. Boolean functions are the basic building
blocks of these cryptosystems. In some applications, these functions have only a single
output. In other applications, these Boolean functions have multiple outputs. Multiple
1.1 Problems deﬁnition 3
output Boolean functions are called vectorial Boolean functions or Substitution Boxes (S-
boxes) [4]. The study of different cryptographic properties of Boolean functions is im-
portant because of the strong connections between known cryptanalytic attacks and these
properties. In many cases, the ciphers security against a given attack can be assured by the
existence of a speciﬁc property in the underlying Boolean functions or S-boxes. In this the-
sis, we introduce a new concept to evaluate the strength of the cryptographic Boolean func-
tion called nonlinearity-proﬁle. This measure calculates the function nonlinearity when
some of the function coordinates are ﬁxed.
Rotation Symmetric Boolean functions (RSBFs) [5,6] have been extensively studied in
recent years because of their small search space and their richness in terms of cryptographic
properties. However, there are some other characteristics these functions might have which
should be avoided. Namely, the existence of non trivial (i.e., non-zero) linear structure
in Boolean functions is regarded as a weakness and a function possessing this property is
considered vulnerable to cryptanalysis. Hence, in this thesis we examine the existence of
linear structures in RSBFs.
The existence of a tradeoff between the cryptographic properties in GF (2) functions
has potential consequences on the security of a cryptosystem. For example, we cannot
construct a function over GF (2) with the maximum order of correlation immunity and al-
gebraic degree higher than 1. On the other hand, when the function is deﬁned over GF (p),
p > 2, it is possible to construct a non-linear function that has a maximum order of corre-
lation immunity. Thus, motivated by the better cryptographic properties bounds that these
functions can achieve, we extend various cryptographic properties from GF (2) to prime
ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (p).
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1.1.2 Public key cryptosystems based on Boolean permutations
Most widely adopted public key cryptosystems are based on two underlying hard problems,
discrete logarithm-based such as Difﬁe-Hellman, and integer factorization-based such as
the RSA algorithms [1]. Regardless of the considerable improvement that has been made
in implementing these systems, they are still relatively computationally costly, particularly
in resource-constrained environments. To tackle this problem, several attempts were made
to construct public key cryptosystems based on trapdoor Boolean permutations that can be
implemented efﬁciently. The main idea is to ﬁnd a class of efﬁciently computable random-
looking permutations with compact representations, which can be easily inverted given
some trapdoor information.
1.1.3 Image encryption schemes based on discrete transforms
Discrete transforms, such as Fourier, Cosine, and Wavelets, have been widely applied to
diverse ﬁelds including image processing. Motivated by the wide available spectrum of
possible applications, the majority of these transforms have been generalized by adding
extra parameters to their original mathematical deﬁnitions. A common characteristic of
these generalized transforms is that they have a relatively larger number of independent
parameters as compared to their corresponding original forms. This led many researchers to
propose image encryption algorithms based on a single or multiple steps of these transforms
where their parameters are used as encryption keys. A careful analysis of these algorithms
reveals two major problems associated with their practical implementation, namely, the
security and the performance in terms of both bandwidth and throughput.
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1.1.4 Secret sharing schemes for images and 3D models
The continuing advancements in computer technologies and the rapid increase in internet
users have led to the increasing usage of network-based data transmission. In various ap-
plications, such as military documents and sensitive business data, the necessity of keeping
these documents available and conﬁdential must be ﬁrmly implemented. In recent years,
digital multimedia contents such as 2D images and 3D models have been considered as
important as any other sensitive information. Therefore, several 2D image-protection tech-
niques have been proposed to assure the security of 2D images. Most of these systems
enhance availability by providing full replication. Client-side encryption can protect infor-
mation conﬁdentiality even when storage nodes are compromised. Secret sharing schemes
offer an alternative to these approaches that provides both information conﬁdentiality and
availability. These schemes encode, replicate, and divide information into multiple pieces,
or shares, that can be stored at different storage nodes. The system can only reconstruct the
information when enough shares are available.
1.2 Objectives
Our objectives may be summarized as follows:
• Investigate various cryptographic properties for different classes of Boolean
functions, and then generalize some of the previous results on cryptographic
Boolean functions to functions deﬁned over GF (p), p > 2.
• Study the security of public key cryptosystems based on Boolean permutations.
In particular, we show that the constructions suggested by C. Wu and V. Varad-
harajan are insecure by presenting an attack that can be used to invert this class
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of Boolean permutations without the knowledge of the secret key parameters.
• Provide a comprehensive analysis on the security and efﬁciency of the image
encryption schemes based on discrete multiple parameters transforms.
• Analyze the security of the matrix-based secret sharing scheme for images
proposed by M. Rey and present two secret sharing approaches for 3D models.
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1.3 Background
Throughout history, people have always felt the need to communicate information without
the fear of being intercepted by unintended recipients. To achieve this objective, the in-
formation was encoded in such a way that the intended receiver is the only one who can
retrieve its contents. This process has developed into the science of cryptography. The de-
velopment of cryptography has been paralleled by the development of cryptanalysis, the art
and science of how to compromise such cryptographic systems. The encoding technique
has been termed encryption, which is the transformation of the original data (plaintext),
into a form that is unreadable without the appropriate secret knowledge, referred to as a
key. This unreadable information is called ciphertext. To get back the original contents, the
intended receiver who has the key will perform a reverse operation, called decryption. A











Figure 1.1: General architecture of a cryptosystem.
Cryptographic techniques are classiﬁed into two categories: symmetric-key and public-
key. When using symmetric-key techniques, both the encryption and decryption keys have
to be kept secret. On the other hand, when using public-key algorithms, one part of the key
will be public (e.g., the encryption key or veriﬁcation key) and the other key has to be kept
private. Despite the key management problems associated with symmetric-key algorithms,
they are invaluable components in any cryptographic system. This is mainly because they
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x1 x2 x3 f
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
Table 1.1: Example of truth table representation of a 3-variable Boolean function.
are orders of magnitudes faster than their public-key counterparts. Public-key primitives
are usually constructed based on some number theoretic ideas (e.g., RSA [2] which is
based on the difﬁculty of factoring large integers and ElGamal cryptosystem [7] which is
based on the difﬁculty of solving the discrete log problem). On the other hand, symmetric-
key primitives are constructed using Boolean functions interconnected in such a way that
achieve the security requirements of these primitives (e.g., confusion and diffusion [8] in
block ciphers).
1.3.1 Boolean Functions
Boolean functions are the basic components of symmetric key systems which are funda-
mental tools in the design of all types of digital security protocols (e.g., communications,
ﬁnancial and e-commerce). There are many ways to represent Boolean functions. In this
thesis, we focus on the two relevant representations: Truth Table (TT) and the Algebraic
Normal Form (ANF).
Truth Table Representation
We represent a Boolean function by the output column of its truth table as a binary string Tf
of length 2n as follows: Tf = [f(00 · · · 00)f(00 · · · 01) . . . f(11 · · · 10)f(11 · · · 11)]. Table
1.1 shows an example for the truth table of a 3-variable function, where Tf = [00110110].
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A function f is said to be balanced if its output column in the truth table has an equal
number of 0’s and 1’s, i.e. wt(f) = 2n−1 where wt denotes the Hamming weight of the
function f , i.e., the number of 1′s in its truth table.
ANF Representation
Another representation of an n-variable Boolean function f , called the Algebraic Normal
Form (ANF), is a multivariate polynomial given by






aijxixj ⊕ . . .⊕ a1,...,nx1 · · · xn,
where the coefﬁcients a0, a1, a1,...,n ∈ F2. The algebraic degree denoted by deg(f) is the
number of variables in the highest order term with a nonzero coefﬁcient. The set of all n-
variable Boolean functions is equal to 22n . Enumerating all Boolean functions with n ≥ 6
is beyond the computational capability of today’s PCs.
1.3.2 Discrete transforms
The purpose of the transform coding is to decompose a set of correlated signal samples into
a set of uncorrelated spectral coefﬁcients with energy concentrated in as few coefﬁcients
as possible. The uneven distribution of signal energy in the frequency domain has made
signal decomposition an important practical problem. Recently, discrete transforms have
been widely used in image processing applications. Speciﬁcally, transform-based data en-
cryption techniques have become attractive for many recent communication systems. In
recent years, there has been an enormous interest in developing parameterized versions of
the existing ﬁxed transforms [9–13]. These parameterized transforms were proposed to be
used in a wider range of applications compared to its original version to provide more ﬂexi-
bility in representing, interpreting and processing of signals. For example, the independent
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parameters of a fractional discrete transform have been used as an additional secret key
for watermarking [14] and for encryption [15–17]. One of the widely used discrete trans-
forms is the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). This transform is invertible and has been
extensively employed in signal processing and analysis.










X(k)ej2πkn/N , n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 (1.2)
A DFT matrix is an expression of a discrete Fourier transform as a matrix multiplica-
tion. If F is N ×N discrete Fourier transform matrix, then the 1D-DFT of a N × 1 vector
x is:
DFT(x) = F · x
and the 2D-DFT of a matrix P is given by:
DFT(P) = (F · (F · P)T )T
1.3.3 Secret sharing
Secret sharing is a procedure for sharing a secret among a number of participants such
that only the qualiﬁed subsets of participants have the ability to reconstruct the secret. The
simplest secret splitting method is the (2, 2)-scheme [1] where the secret K is split into two
shares X and Y . Neither X nor Y independently provide any information about the secret.
Let K = k1, . . . , kn be a binary string of length n, called the secret.
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1. for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let xi ∈ F2 be chosen at random.
2. for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let yi = xi + ki mod 2.
3. then X = x1, . . . , xn and Y = y1, . . . , yn are two shares corresponding to the secret
K.
4. To recover the secret, K is computed as K = X + Y mod 2.
The majority of existing secret sharing schemes are generalized within the so-called
(t, n)-threshold framework [1]. This framework splits the content of a secret message into
n shares in a way that requires the presence of at least t shares for the secret message
reconstruction. If t = n, then all the shares are required in the (n, n)-threshold scheme to
recover the secret. Conversely, the lost of any of the produced shares results in inaccessible
secret messages. Therefore, apart from the simplest (2, 2)-schemes that are commonly used
as a private key cryptosystem solution, the general (t, n)-threshold schemes with t < n are
often the point of interest due to their ability to recover the secret message even if several
shares are lost. In this case, any possible combinations of t shares can be used to recover
the secret message. Since protection against cryptanalytic attacks, including brute force
enumeration, should remain unchanged regardless of how many shares are available until
the threshold t is reached, the use of (t− 1) shares should not reveal any valid information
about the secret compared to that obtained by only one share.
Shamir (t, n)-Threshold Scheme [18]
Let x1,, . . . , xn be n distinct non-zero elements of FP . Given a secret K ∈ FP , the n shares
are generated as follows:
1. Let a1, . . . , at−1be chosen independently at random from FP .
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2. Deﬁne




j mod p. (1.3)
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let the share si = (xi, yi), where yi = a(xi).












The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
 In Chapter 2, we investigate various cryptographic properties for different classes of
Boolean functions, and then we generalize some of the previous results on crypto-
graphic Boolean functions to functions deﬁned over GF (p).
 In Chapter 3, we analyze the security of the public key cryptosystem PCK2 family
proposed by Wu and Varadharajan. In particular, we show that the suggested con-
struction for the PCK2 family is insecure by presenting an efﬁcient cryptanalytic
attack that allows the cryptanalyst to invert the class of Boolean permutations used
in the construction without the knowledge of the secret key parameters.
 In Chapter 4, we show that image encryption algorithms based on parameterized
discrete transforms are inefﬁcient and insecure for the practical applications usage.
 In Chapter 5, we provide an algebraic cryptanalysis of the matrix-based image secret
sharing scheme. Also, we introduce a geometric framework for 3D secret sharing as
a defence mechanism for 3D objects.
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 In Chapter 6, we summarize the contributions in this thesis and propose some future
research directions.
 In the bibliography section, we cite in references [90–97] the list of publications
resulting from this thesis.
CHAPTER 2
Cryptographic Functions
Boolean functions play a major role in the construction of symmetric key primitives such as
block ciphers, stream ciphers and hash functions. The security of these primitives depends
on the cryptographic properties of the Boolean functions used in its construction. Various
criteria, including balance, nonlinearity [19], resiliency [20] and algebraic immunity [21],
have been proposed for measuring the cryptographic strength of Boolean functions. Let
criterion C denote the cryptographic property of interest. We deﬁne the C-proﬁle of the
Boolean function as a measure that shows how this criterion degrades when we ﬁx a subset
of the input coordinates of the function. This is interesting from a cryptanalytic point of
view, since ﬁxing the coordinates of a cryptosystem is a well known cryptanalysis method.
In Section 2.2, we introduce this concept and apply it to the nonlinearity property of the
cryptographic Boolean function.
Due to its richness in terms of cryptographically properties along with its small search
space (22n/n comparable to the whole space 22n), the class of Rotation Symmetric Boolean
functions (RSBFs) has become the main focus on searching for a Boolean function with
good properties. Additionally, there are some other characteristics which may degrade the
security of the underlying cryptographic primitives and should be avoided. For instance,
a non trivial linear structure [22] other than all-zero is regarded as a weakness and the
14
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function posses this characteristic is considered fragile and should not be used in crypto-
graphic algorithms. Therefore, in Section 2.3 we examine the existence of linear structures
in RSBFs.
Traditionally, cryptographic applications designed on hardware have always tried to
take advantage of the simplicity of implementation functions over GF (2) to reduce costs
and improve performance. However, in recent years there has been growing interest of the
implementation of cryptographic primitives based on GF (p). We therefore, in Section 2.4,
generalize some of the previous results on cryptographic Boolean functions to functions
deﬁned over GF (p), p > 2. We ﬁrst generalize Siegenthaler’s construction to functions
deﬁned over ﬁnite ﬁeld. Next, we characterize the linear structures of functions overGF (p)
in terms of their Walsh transform values. We then investigate the relation between the
autocorrelation coefﬁcients of functions over GF (p) and their Walsh spectrum. We also
derive an upper bound for the dimension of the linear space of the functions deﬁned over
GF (p). Finally, we present a method to construct a bent function from semi-bent functions.
2.1 Algebraic preliminaries
In this section we introduce deﬁnitions and concepts used throughout this chapter.






where w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) ∈ Fn2 , and < w · x > denotes the inner product of w and
x, i.e., < w · x >= ⊕ni=1wixi.
A function f : Fn2 → F2 is called an afﬁne function if f(x) can be expressed as f(x) =
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a · x ⊕ b, where a ∈ Fn2 and b ∈ F2. If b = 0 the function is called a linear function.
The algebraic degree of the function deg(f(x)), is the degree of the largest product term
which exists in its Algebraic Normal Form (ANFf ). In this context, we use f
d
(x) to denote a
Boolean function with algebraic degree equal d. The nonlinearity,NL, of f is the minimum
distance between f and the set of afﬁne functions. In terms of the Walsh transform, the
nonlinearity of f is given by





For even n, bent functions [24] achieve the maximum nonlinearity 2n−1−2n2−1. For odd
n, a semi-bent function has nonlinearity 2(2n−2 − 2n−12 −1). For odd n > 7, the maximum
achievable nonlinearity is an open problem related to determining the covering radius of
RM-codes [25].
Deﬁnition 2.1.2. [26] If two functions f, g : Fn2 → F2, satisfy g(x) = f(xA + b) with
b ∈ Fn2 and A is a nonsingular n× n matrix, we say that g is afﬁnely equivalent to f .
Deﬁnition 2.1.3 (Linear Structure). A vector α ∈ Fn2 is called a linear structure of f if
f(x)⊕ f(x⊕α) is constant. The 0 is a trivial linear structure for any Boolean function.
Deﬁnition 2.1.4 (Derivative of Boolean function). The derivative of a Boolean function
f(x), with respect to a vector α ∈ Fn2 is deﬁned as:
dαf(x) = f(x)⊕ f(x⊕α) (2.3)
If the functions has a linear structure α, then deg(dαf(x)) = 0.
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2.2 Nonlinearity proﬁle of cryptographic Boolean func-
tions
The security of symmetric key ciphers mostly depends on the cryptographic properties of
their Boolean functions. In order for these cryptosystems to resist various statistical crypt-
analytic attacks (e.g., correlation attack [27], differential cryptanalysis [28], linear crypt-
analysis [29], and algebraic attacks [30]), the Boolean functions used in its construction
have to satisfy these cryptographic properties.
In this section, we mainly investigate the nonlinearity-proﬁle concept and its appli-
cation to the nonlinearity-proﬁle of Boolean functions. While nonlinearity measures the
distance between the Boolean function and the set of afﬁne functions, the nonlinearity pro-
ﬁle measures the corresponding distance when some of the function coordinates are ﬁxed.
This is interesting from a cryptographic point of view, since ﬁxing the coordinates of a
cryptosystem is a well known cryptanalysis method. Similar notion has been previously
considered by Carlet [31], where the hyper-bent function was introduced. This class of
functions remains bent when any even integer k coordinate are ﬁxed, 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
2.2.1 Nonlinearity proﬁle
The nonlinearity-proﬁle depicts how the nonlinearity of the Boolean function degrades as
we ﬁx subsets of its input coordinates. Let NL denotes the nonlinearity of the function
f . Then NL(f |xi1 · · · xim) denotes the nonlinearity of the function obtained by ﬁxing the
input subset (xi1 · · · xim) ∈ {x1, · · · , xn} to a speciﬁc value over Fm2 . We deﬁne the average
nonlinearity-proﬁle of the function f as NLPm = E(NL(f |xi1 · · · xim)), 1 < m ≤ n −
2, where the expectation E(·) is evaluated over {xi1 , · · · , xim} ∈ Fm2 . The minimum
nonlinearity proﬁle is deﬁned as NLP ′m = minNL(f |xi1 · · · xim), 1 < m ≤ n− 2, where
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the minimum is evaluated over {xi1 , · · · , xim} ∈ Fm2 .
Example 2.2.1. Consider the two 5-variable Boolean functions f = x1x3⊕x2x3⊕x1x4⊕
x2x4 ⊕ x1x5 ⊕ x2x5 ⊕ x3x5 and g = x1x3 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ x2x5. Both functions have NL = 12,
correlation immunity = 0, algebraic degree = 2, absolute indicator [23] = 32 and posses
PC(1). Figure 2.1 shows how the average nonlinearity of both functions varies when ﬁx
subset of its input variables.
The minimum nonlinearity proﬁle is also an important property for the cryptanalysts.
Figure 2.2 shows that if we ﬁx two inputs x2x3 of function g, the nonlinearity will collapse
to zero, i.e., NLP ′2(g) = 0. Hence, an attacker can approximate the derived function by an
afﬁne function.

















Figure 2.1: The nonlinearity proﬁles for f and g in Example 2.2.1.
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Figure 2.2: The minimum nonlinearity proﬁles for f and g in Example 2.2.1.
The nonlinearity-proﬁle provides a good measure to differentiate between Boolean
functions with the same nonlinearity. For example, using exhaustive search, one can show
that for n = 5, balanced Boolean functions with maximum nonlinearity (NL = 12) can be
classiﬁed into 144 classes based on their average nonlinearity proﬁles as shown in Figure
2.3.
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Class 144: lower bound
Class 1: upper bound
Figure 2.3: Nonlinearity proﬁles for all 5-variable balanced functions with NL =12 (144
Classes).
It should also be noted that afﬁnely equivalent functions do not necessarily have the
same nonlinearity proﬁle.
Example 2.2.2. Let f = x1⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x1x4⊕ x3x4⊕ x1x2x5⊕ x2x3x5⊕ x2x4x5 and
g = x1x2 ⊕ x2x4 ⊕ x1x2x4 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ x2x4x5. Although f and g are afﬁnely equivalent,
their nonlinearity-proﬁles (shown in Figure 2.4) are different.
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Figure 2.4: The nonlinearity proﬁles for f and g in Example 2.2.2.
It is important to note that adding any linear term to the function does not affect the
nonlinearity proﬁle, but it can change the balanedness of the function.
2.2.2 Graph representation of quadratic Boolean functions
A quadratic function can be represented by undirected graph with n nodes. The existence of
a quadratic term xixj in the Boolean function is denoted by an arc in the graph connecting
node i with node j. It is easy to show that Boolean functions corresponding to isomorphic
graphs have the same nonlinearity proﬁle. In [25], the quadratic bent functions, n = 4, are
classiﬁed into 4 distinct graphs , depending on the Number of Quadratic Terms (NQT ) that
appear in their algebraic normal form as shown in Figure 2.5. It is important to note that,
for n = 4 all the quadratic bent functions with the same NQT have the same nonlinearity-
proﬁle. While on the contrary, for n > 4 the quadratic functions with same NQT have
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different nonlinearity-proﬁles.


















Figure 2.5: Graph representation for different classes of quadratic function n = 4,
NL = 6.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the graphs corresponding to different classes of quadratic
functions with NL = 12 and NL = 28 (maximum achievable nonlinearity for n = 5
and n = 6, respectively). It should be noted that one can easily count all the quadratic
functions corresponding to a given graph. For simplicity, we represent the graphs with
its Degree Vector DV . By permuting the vector we get all the functions with the same
nonlinearity proﬁle. For example, when the number of quadratic terms equals 2, the degree




)/2! = 15 functions.





) = 30. Tables 2.1-2.3 show the average nonlinearity proﬁle corresponding to the
graphs for n = 4, 5 and 6.






Table 2.1: The best nonlinearity proﬁles for 4-variables quadratic functions.
















































Figure 2.6: Graph representation of quadratic functions n = 5, NL = 12.
It is worth observing that some quadratic functions with speciﬁc number of quadratic
terms do not achieve the maximum nonlinearity (e.g., for n = 4, NQT = 5 and n = 6,
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NQT NLP1 NLP2 NLP3
2 4.4 1.2 0.2
3 4.8 1.6 0.3
4 5.2 2 0.4
5 6 2 0.5
6 6 2 0.6
7 5.6 2 0.7
8 5.2 2 0.8
9 4.8 2 0.9
10 6 2 1
Table 2.2: The best nonlinearity proﬁles for 5-variables quadratic functions.
NQT NLP1 NLP2 NLP3 NLP4
3 12 4.4 1.2 0.2
4 12 4.53 1.4 0.26
5 12 4.8 1.6 0.33
6 12 5.06 1.8 0.4
7 12 5.46 2 0.46
8 12 5.6 2 0.53
9 12 5.73 2 0.6
10 12 5.33 2 0.66
11 12 5.46 2 0.73
12 12 5.06 2 0.8
13 12 5.2 2 0.86
15 12 6 2 1
Table 2.3: The best nonlinearity proﬁles for 6-variables quadratic functions.
NQT = 14). Based on our experimental results, it is clear that for n ≤ 7, quadratic
functions with all the quadratic terms have the optimum nonlinearity-proﬁle.
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Figure 2.7: Graph representation of quadratic functions n = 6, NL = 28.
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NQT NLP1 NLP2 NLP3 NLP4 NLP5
3 24.57 9.71 3.25 0.85 0.19
4 25.14 10.47 3.82 1.08 0.23
5 25.71 11.23 4.4 1.31 0.28
6 26.85 12 4.57 1.42 0.33
7 28 12 4.8 1.6 0.38
8 28 12 4.91 1.65 0.42
9 28 12 5.08 1.77 0.47
10 28 12 4.97 1.77 0.52
11 28 12 5.02 1.82 0.57
12 28 12 5.37 2 0.61
13 28 12 5.54 2 0.66
14 28 12 5.2 2 0.71
15 27.42 12 5.25 2 0.76
16 28 12 5.14 2 0.80
17 28 12 5.31 2 0.85
18 26.85 12 5.14 2 0.90
19 26.85 12 5.31 2 0.952
20 25.14 12 5.42 2 1
21 28 12 6 2 1
Table 2.4: The best nonlinearity proﬁles for 7-variables quadratic functions.
2.3 Linear structure of cryptographic rotation symmetric
Boolean functions
Most modern encryption schemes achieve their security based on the properties of the
corresponding Boolean functions. This is true for the overall plaintext-ciphertext mappings,
as well as for the internal operations used, such as the substitution boxes in the round
mapping of a product cipher. Recent advances in cryptanalysis techniques, for example
differential [28] and linear [29] cryptanalysis show explicitly that weaknesses in the internal
operations of a cipher can be exploited in attacks that succeed faster than exhaustive search.
On the other hand, obtaining Boolean functions with strong properties is a non-trivial task
due to the huge search space.
Linear structure is an important criterion to measure the weakness of Boolean functions
in their cryptographic applications. This criterion has been investigated for its cryptanalytic
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signiﬁcance. In [32], Evertse stated that “a block cipher has a linear structure if there are
subsets of plaintext bits P , key bits K and ciphertext bits C of this block cipher, such
that for each plaintext and each key, a simultaneous change of all plaintext bits in P and
all key bits in K has the same effect on the exclusive-or sum of the bits in C of the corre-
sponding ciphertext.” A good example on the threat of the existence of linear structures in
block ciphers was given in [33], where the authors showed that the complementation of all
plaintext bits and key bits in DES function results in the complementation of all ciphertext
bits. Also, it has been shown in [22,32–34] that block ciphers with linear structure are vul-
nerable to the attacks much faster than exhaustive search. Several studies were conducted
on the existence of the linear structures in other classes of the Boolean functions (e.g., for
vectorial functions (functions with multi outputs) [35] and for symmetric functions [36]).
2.3.1 Rotation symmetric Boolean functions
To solve the problem of the large search space, the space of the Boolean function was di-
vided into several classes with smaller space. Rotation Symmetric Boolean Functions (RS-
BFs) is one of these rich cryptographic classes of Boolean functions which has been given
more attention recently. RSBFs have been analyzed in [5], where the authors examined
the nonlinearity of these functions up to 9 variables and found encouraging results. Then
extended studies have been conducted in [6, 37] and signiﬁcant properties of these func-
tions up to 8 variables have been exhibited. The authors also discussed the enumeration
of RSBFs for speciﬁc degrees. The usage of these functions was ﬁrst carried out in [38],
where they used it as components in the compression function of the hashing algorithm.





n(x1, . . . , xn))=f(x1, . . . , xn) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n where ρkn acts as k-cyclic rotation on
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an n-bit vector, i.e.
ρkn(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = (x1+k, x2+k, ..., xn, x1, . . . , xk) (2.4)
The space of RSBFs for n-variable is of a size approximately 22n/n, therefore the search
in this space becomes comparatively easier than searching the whole space 22n . It was
shown in [6] that it is easy to ﬁnd a RSBF with 7-variable, 2-resilient and nonlinearity
56, which was earlier considered as a function that is hard to search for. In addition,
these functions also posses the best known autocorrelation spectra [39]. Besides, some
of the Boolean functions that were open problems for quite some time have been found
in the RSBF class or a concatenation of two RSBFs [5, 40]. Recently, the search in RSBF
class has yielded Boolean function with high nonlinearity and maximum possible algebraic
immunity [41] which can be used directly in stream ciphers. Thus it is important to study
these functions and its possessed properties intensively.
The following example shows the partitions of the RSBF output to form smaller search
space.
Example 2.3.1. For n = 4, the 16 input patterns of a RSBF are divided into 6 partitions
which consequently divided the function output into the following subsets
f(0, 0, 0, 0)
f(0, 0, 0, 1) = f(0, 0, 1, 0) = f(0, 1, 0, 0) = f(1, 0, 0, 0)
f(0, 0, 1, 1) = f(0, 1, 1, 0) = f(1, 1, 0, 0) = f(1, 0, 0, 1)
f(0, 1, 0, 1) = f(1, 0, 1, 0)
f(0, 1, 1, 1) = f(1, 0, 1, 1) = f(1, 1, 0, 1) = f(1, 1, 1, 0)
f(1, 1, 1, 1)
Table 2.5 shows the number of RSBFs versus the total space for different values of n.
By following the notations in [6], we denote by Gn(x1, . . . , xn) the orbit of (x1, . . . , xn)
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
gn 2 3 4 6 8 14 20 36 60 108
Total space 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
Table 2.5: Number of RSBFs versus the total space for different values of n.
where Gn(x1, . . ., xn) = {ρkn(x1, . . . , xn), 1 ≤ k ≤ n}, gn is the number of the output
partition and 2gn is the number of the RSBFs for n-variable function. Given (x1, . . . , xn), a
function is RSBF if it takes the same value for all the inputs inGn(x1, . . . , xn). From Exam-
ple 2.3.1, f(ρkn(0, 1, 0, 1))= f(0, 1, 0, 1)= f(1, 0, 1, 0) , Gn(0, 1, 0, 1) = Gn(ρ
k
n(0, 1, 0, 1))
= {(0, 1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0)} and g4 = 6.
Remark 2.1. The Walsh-transform of a rotation symmetric function is also a rotation sym-
metric.
2.3.2 Linear structures of rotation symmetric Boolean functions
Recall that a vector α ∈ Fn2 is called a linear structure of f(x) iff(x⊕α) ⊕ f(x) =
c, where c ∈ F2. We denote by 0 and 1 the all-zero vector and all-one vector of Fn2
respectively. In this section, we ﬁrst study the RSBF when its input bitwise XORed with
all-one vector 1. Later we examine the existence of linear structures in RSBFs class.
Lemma 2.1. If f(x) is a RSBF then f(x⊕ 1) is also RSBF.
Proof. The proof follows by noting that ρkn(1) = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Consequently, we have
f(ρkn(x⊕ 1))= f(ρkn(x)⊕ ρkn(1))=f(x⊕ 1).
The following lemma was proven in [23].
Lemma 2.2. Let f(x) be a Boolean function and b ∈ Fn2 . If g(x) = f(x⊕ b), then
deg(g(x)) = deg(f(x)) (2.5)
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Remark 2.2. f(x) is balanced if and only if F (0) = 0. Recall that if g(x) = f(x⊕α), then
the Walsh transform of g(x) is given by G(w) = (−1)<w·α>F (w). It is also easy to show
that if f(x) is balanced, then G(0) = 0, i.e. g(x) is also balanced.
Theorem 2.3. If f(x) is a RSBF and has a linear structure α, then all the elements in
Gn(α) are also linear structures of f(x).
Proof. Since f(x) = f(ρkn(x)), it follows that f(x⊕α) = f(ρkn(x⊕α))= f(ρkn(x) ⊕
ρkn(α)). Thus, all the sets generated by ρ
k
n(α) are linear structures of f(x).
Remark 2.3. The derivative of f(x)(on a non-constant function) reduces its algebraic degree
for all α ∈ Fn2\{0},
deg(dαf(x)) < deg(f(x)). (2.6)
Remark 2.4. If deg(f(x)) = n, then for all α ∈ Fn2\{0}
deg(dαf(x)) = n− 1. (2.7)
Lemma 2.4. The function f(x)
d=n
has no non trivial linear structure.
Proof. f(x)
d=n





⊕x1x2 · · · xn
It follows from remarks 2.3 and 2.4 that deg(dαg(x))≤ n−2 and deg(dα(x1x2 · · · xn))=n−
1. Thus deg(dα f(x)
d=n
) = 0.
Theorem 2.5. Let f(x)
d=n−1
be a RSBF with a linear structure α, then α ∈ {0,1}.
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Proof. If f(x) is RSBF of degree = n − 1, then all the terms of weight n − 1 are in the
same orbit Gn(0, 1, . . . , 1, 1). As a result of the rotation, all the monomials of degree n− 1
will appear in its ANFf , and every variable xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n will appear exactly in n − 1
monomials of degree n− 1. Then we can write f(x)
d=n−1





⊕x2x3 · · ·xn ⊕ x1x3 · · · xn ⊕ x1x2x4 · · · xn ⊕ · · · ⊕ x1x2 · · · xn−1 (2.8)
The derivative of any monomial of degree n− 1, where it is degenerated in variable xi
, is not constant for all α except for the vector with the ith component equal 1 and all the
others components are 0. By taking the derivative of the term x2x3 · · · xn ⊕ x1x3 · · · xn ⊕
x1x2x4 · · · xn ⊕ · · · ⊕ x1x2 · · ·xn−1 for any α ∈ {0,1}, only one monomial will result in
constant whereas the others will result in a non-constant distinctive terms of degree n− 2.
Also, the derivative of g(x)
d<n−1
will result in a function of degree less than n − 2. Thus, the
derivative of f(x)
d=n−1
will always result in a function of degree n− 2.
Let ANFGn(x1,...,xn) denotes all the terms in the ANF generated by Gn(x1, . . . , xn).
Example 2.3.2. Let f(x) be a RSBF with 3 variables where the orbit Gn(0, 1, 1) = 1 and
the other orbits are zeros. Then f(0, 1, 1) = f(1, 1, 0) = f(1, 0, 1) = 1. Thus
ANFf = ANFGn(0,1,1) = x1x2 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x1x3.
It is apparent that all xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 appear exactly in (n − 1) = 2 terms of degree
(n− 1) = 2. Thus, the derivative for this ANFf will not be constant for any α ∈ F n2 .
The following conjectures were conﬁrmed by computer simulations for n ≤ 10.
Conjecture 2.1. If f(x) is a RSBF with even number of variables, balanced and has alge-
braic degree d = n− 1, then f(x) has no non trivial linear structure.
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Conjecture 2.2. If f(x) is RSBF with odd number of variables and has algebraic degree
d = n− 2, then f(x) has no non trivial linear structure.
2.4 Generalization of cryptographic Boolean functions prop-
erties to GF (p)
The existence of a tradeoff between the cryptographic properties in GF (2) functions has
an immense consequences on the security of the cryptosystem using these functions. For
instance, the algebraic degree and the correlation immunity order in Boolean functions are
two important security measures. It is well known that a cryptographic function that has a
high resistance to correlation attacks may have a low linear complexity to counter the linear
synthesis by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [42].
In the special case where p = 2, the Siegenthaler inequality [43] states that if a function
f(x) with n variables is a correlation-immune of order m then its algebraic degree d ≤
n − m. Moreover, if f(x) is an m-resilient, m ≤ n − 2, then d ≤ n − m − 1. It is
clear from the Siegenthaler inequality that we cannot construct a function over GF (2) with
the maximum order of correlation immunity (n − 1) and algebraic degree higher than 1.
On the other hand, when the function is deﬁned over GF (p), it is possible to construct an
(n− 1)-correlation immune function with algebraic degree greater than 1. For example, let
f(x) : F25 → F5 such that f(x1, x2) = x1 + x32. Then, f(x) is a resilient function of degree
1 and its algebraic degree equals 3 [44].
This example illustrate the fact that functions over GF (p) can possess high correlation
immunity and high algebraic degree. Thus motivated by the better bounds these functions
can achieve, various cryptographic properties have already been extended from GF (2) to
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other ﬁnite ﬁelds. For example, [44] presented a series of constructions of correlation-
immune function over ﬁnite ﬁelds. Later, [45] investigated the existence, construction,
and enumeration of resilient functions. [46] extended the concept of the Strict Avalanche
Criterion (SAC) to GF (p) functions. Due to its importance in cryptography and coding
theory, bent function and its properties were generalized in [47]. The concept of hyper-
bent function was extended to functions over GF (p) in [48]. A new characterization of
semi-bent and bent quadratic functions on ﬁnite ﬁelds was given in [49]. The author in [50]
generalized the counting results of rotation symmetric Boolean functions to the rotation
symmetric polynomials over ﬁnite ﬁelds GF (p). [51] gave a lower bound on the number
of n-variable balanced symmetric polynomials over ﬁnite ﬁelds GF (p). In this section,
we generalize some of the previous results on cryptographic binary functions to functions
deﬁned over GF (p), where p is an odd prime.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section 2.4.1 brieﬂy recalls the nec-
essary deﬁnitions and algebraic preliminaries required in presenting our result. In section
2.4.2, we ﬁrst generalize the Siegenthaler’s construction to functions deﬁned over ﬁnite
ﬁeld and then derive their cryptographic properties. In section 2.4.3, we characterize the
linear structures of functions over GF (p) in terms of their Walsh transform values. In sec-
tion 2.4.4, we investigate the relation between the autocorrelation coefﬁcients of functions
over GF (p) and their Walsh spectrum. In section 2.4.5, we derive the upper bound for the
dimension of the linear space of the functions deﬁned over GF (p). Finally, in section 2.4.6
we present a method to construct bent functions from semi-bent functions that has linear
structures. Throughout the rest of this chapter, let f(·) denotes an n variable function over
GF (p).
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2.4.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some deﬁnitions and algebraic preliminaries required to prove
our result.
If f : Fnp → Fp, then f can be uniquely expressed in the following form












2 · · ·xinn , (2.9)
where ai1i2···in ∈ Fp. This representation of f is called the algebraic normal form of f .
The largest i1 + i2 + · · · + in with ai1i2···in = 0 is called the algebraic degree of f . The
function f is called balanced if its output is uniformly distributed.
Deﬁnition 2.4.1. Let p be a prime and u = ei(2π/p) be the q-th root unity in C, where
i =










where w,α ∈ Fnp and < w · x > denotes the dot product between w and x, i.e., < w · x >=∑n
i=1 wixi mod p. We will denote by |X| the magnitude of the complex number X . Most
of the properties of the cryptographic functions can be measured using the Walsh transform
or the autocorrelation function.
Deﬁnition 2.4.2. A function f : Fnp → Fp is bent if and only if |F (w)| = pn/2 for all
w ∈ Fnp [47].
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Deﬁnition 2.4.3. A function f : Fnp → Fp is semi-bent if and only if the absolute values
of its Walsh transform are |p(n+1)/2| and 0 that occur with frequency pn−1 and pn − pn−1,
respectively.
Deﬁnition 2.4.4. The derivative of a function f(x) with respect to a vector e ∈ Fnp is deﬁned
as def(x) = f(x + e)−f(x). The vector e is called a linear structure of f(x) if def(x) = c
(constant) for any x ∈ Fnp . The set of all linear structures of f(x) form a subspace called
linear subspace Vn.
2.4.2 Generalization of Siegenthaler’s construction
A simple and useful method to construct Boolean functions is through direct construc-
tions. Direct constructions can produce functions that are optimal with respect to the de-
signed property. Lots of research efforts have been put into these construction techniques
in GF (2). Thus, it is signiﬁcant to extend these constructions from GF (2) to GF (p).
Siegenthaler [43] proposed a method to construct a Boolean function f of order n by com-
bining two functions f1, f2 of order n − 1, such that f : Fn2 × Fn2 → F2 : (x¯, xn) 
→
(xn ⊕ 1)f1(x¯)⊕ xnf2(x¯), where x¯ = (x1, · · · , xn − 1).
In this section we generalize the Siegenthaler’s construction method to functions over
GF (p). We also derive some cryptographic properties of the constructed functions.
Let f1, f2, · · · , fp : Fn−1p → Fp. Consider a function f : Fnp → Fp where f = [f1 ‖
f2 ‖ · · · ‖ fp]. In other words, f denotes the function whose truth table is the concatenation
of the truth tables of f1, f2, · · · , fp in the given order.
Algebraic Normal Form (ANF):
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Let x¯ = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1) and x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, xn), then,
f(x|xn = 0) = f1(x¯)
f(x|xn = 1) = f2(x¯)
...
f(x|xn = p− 1) = fp(x¯)



















(xn − j) (2.12)
Walsh Transform: Let w¯ = (w1, w2, . . . , wn−1) and w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn−1, wn)
f1(x¯) = f(x|xn = 0)
f2(x¯) = f(x|xn = 1)
...
fp(x¯) = f(x|xn = p− 1)
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2.4.3 Characterization of linear structures of functions over GF (p)
Direct use of Boolean functions possessing linear structure should be avoided in crypto-
graphic applications. It has been shown in [22, 32–34] that block ciphers with linear struc-
ture are vulnerable to attacks much faster than the exhaustive search. Several studies were
conducted on the existence of the linear structures in several classes of Boolean functions,
as in [35] for vectorial functions and for symmetric functions [36]. In this section, we
study this criterion for functions deﬁned over GF (p). In particular, we characterize linear
structures of functions over GF (p) in terms of their Walsh transform values.
Theorem 2.6. (Generalization of Theorem 1 in [35]) f(x) has a linear structure e ∈ Fnp
with a corresponding constant c if and only if F (w) = 0 for all w such that < w · e >= c.
Proof. Since e is a linear structure of f(x), then f(x + e) − f(x) = c, c ∈ Fp. Let
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Thus, e is a linear structure of f(x) if and only if f(x) = g(x). which implies that < w ·e >
−c = 0.
We use Theorem 2.6 to characterize the linear structures of semi-bent functions deﬁned
over GF (p).
Corollary 2.1. For a semi-bent function f(x), e is a linear structure with a corresponding
constant c if and only if F (w) = 0 for all w such that < w ·e > = c and |F (w)| = p(n+1)/2
for all w such that < w · e >= c.
Proof. The absolute value of the Walsh transform of the semi-bent function have only two
values 0 and p(n+1)/2. Since the number of w that satisfy the equation < w · e > = c is
pn−1(p− 1), which it is exactly the same number of zeros in the Walsh transform F (w) =
0. Hence, there is a one-to-one mapping between the Walsh transform and the relation
< w · e >= c, i.e., F (w) = 0 if and only if < w · e >= c and also |F (w)| = p(n+1)/2 if and
only if < w · e >= c.
2.4.4 Relation between the autocorrelation function and the Walsh
transform
The autocorrelation is another useful criterion in analyzing Boolean functions. It measures
the probability distribution of the output difference of the function for a ﬁxed input dif-
ference. The autocorrelation coefﬁcient AC(α) measures the statistical bias of the output
distribution of dαf(x) relative to the uniform distribution. In this section we show how the
autocorrelation coefﬁcients of functions over GF (p) are related to their Walsh spectrum.
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The following corollary follows directly from the deﬁnition of the inverse Walsh trans-
form and Lemma 2.7.
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Lemma 2.8. Let f(x) be a function deﬁned over GF (p). Then
∑
w∈Fnp






































0 α = −β









We now derive the relation between the Walsh spectrum of the semi-bent functions and
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their autocorrelation coefﬁcients.





Proof. Since f(x) is a semi-bent function, theWalsh transform contains the values Fmax(w)
= p(n+1)/2 and occurs pn−1 times while 0 occurs (pn − pn−1) times. We refer throughout
the rest of the section to the value p(n+1)/2 as Fmax(w). Thus
∑
w∈Fnp
|F (w)|4 = pn−1F 4max(w) = p3n+1.









2.4.5 Walsh spectrum of GF (p) functions with linear structure
In this section we derive the upper bound of the dimension of the linear space of the func-
tions deﬁned over GF (p).
Theorem 2.10. (Generalization of theorem 3 in [52]) Let f(x) be a function deﬁned over
GF (p) with n variables. Then, the dimension k of the linear space Vn is such that k ≤ 1.










If f(x) has a linear space of dimension k, then
∑
α∈Fnp




Substituting in Theorem 2.9 we get
pnF 2max(w) ≥ p2n+k.
Thus
Fmax(w) ≥ pn+k2 .





2 ≥ pn+k2 ,
which implies that k ≤ 1.
2.4.6 Construction of bent functions from semi-bent functions with
linear structure
Bent functions achieve the best possible nonlinearity. Accordingly, they provide good con-
fusion properties, and they are perfect in resisting differential cryptanalysis [28] and by
deﬁnition linear cryptanalysis [29]. Their major ﬂaw is that they are not balanced. Another
useful class of functions which achieve high nonlinearity is semi-bent functions. These
functions also possess good cryptographic characteristics, and some of them are balanced.
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Bent and semi-bent functions over GF (p), p > 2, can exist in even and odd dimensions.
It is possible to construct bent functions with (n + 1) variables from semi-bent function
with n variables, and similarly, construct semi-bent functions with n variables from bent
functions with (n+ 1) variables. Here, we focus on constructing bent functions with n+ 1
variables from semi-bent functions with n variables.
The following lemmas are needed to simplify the proof of Theorem 2.14.
Lemma 2.11. Let g(x) = f(x)− < x · e >. If e is a linear structure for f(x) with a
corresponding constant c, then g(x) has e as a linear structure with the corresponding
constant c− < e · e >.
Proof. If f(x + e)− f(x) = c and g(x) = f(x)− < x · e > then
g(x + e)− g(x) = f(x + e)− < (x + e) · e > −f(x)+ < x · e >
= f(x + e)− < x · e > − < e · e > −f(x)+ < x · e >
= f(x + e)− f(x)− < e · e >
= c− < e · e >














= F (w + e)
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Lemma 2.13. If f(x) has linear structures a and b with corresponding constants c1 and
c2, respectively. Then e = (e1, e2, · · · , en) = a  b is a linear structure for f(x) with a
corresponding constants c1 − c2, where ei = ai − bi mod p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. Let f(x+e1)−f(x) = c1 and f(x+e2)−f(x) = c2. Then f(x+e1)−f(x+e1) =
c1− c2 and f(x+ (e1− e2))− f(x) = c1− c2, which implies (e1− e2) is a linear structure
with a corresponding constant c1 − c2.
From the above lemma, it follows that if e is a linear structure for f(x), then a e ,
a ∈ Fp is also a linear structure for f(x), where a e denotes the vector whose coordinates
are obtained by multiplying the individual coordinates of e by a mod p.
Theorem 2.14. Let f(x) be a semi-bent function deﬁned overGF (p) with non trivial linear
structures e1, e2, · · · , ep−1. Then
[f(x)||f(x)− < x · e1 > ||f(x)− < x · e2 > || . . . ||f(x)− < x · ep−1 >]
is n + 1 bent function if < ei · ei >= 0, for all i = 1, · · · , p− 1.
Proof. Since f(x) has linear structures e1, e2, · · · , ep−1 with corresponding constants c1, c2,
· · · , cp−1, respectively, then from Lemmas 2.11 and 2.12, the function f(x)− < x · ei >,
1 ≤ i ≤ p− 1, will have a linear structure ei with a corresponding constant ci− < ei · ei >
and Walsh transform F (w + ei).
From Corollary 2.1, we have
F (w) = 0 ⇔ < w · e1 >= c1, < w · e2 > = c2, · · · , < w · ep−1 >= cp−1
F (w) = p(n+1)/2 ⇔ < w · e1 >= c1, < w · e2 >= c2, · · · , < w · ep−1 >= cp−1
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By noting that < (w + ei) · ei >=< w · ei > + < ei · ei >, where 1 ≤ i ≤ p− 1, then
F (w + e1) = 0 ⇔ < w · e1 > + < e1 · e1 > = c1− < e1 · e1 >
|F (w + e1)| = p(n+1)/2 ⇔ < w · e1 > + < e1 · e1 >= c1− < e1 · e1 >
F (w + e2) = 0 ⇔ < w · e2 > + < e2 · e2 > = c2− < e2 · e2 >
|F (w + e2)| = p(n+1)/2 ⇔ < w · e2 > + < e2 · e2 >= c2− < e2 · e2 >
...
F (w + ep−1) = 0 ⇔ < w · ep−1 > + < ep−1 · ep−1 >= cp−1− < ep−1 · ep−1 >
|F (w + ep−1)| = p(n+1)/2 ⇔ < w · ep−1 > + < ep−1 · ep−1 >= cp−1− < ep−1 · ep−1 >
Thus, if < w · e1 >= c1 then |F (w)| = p(n+1)/2, F (w + e1) = 0, F (w + e2) = 0, · · · ,
F (w + ep−1) = 0. Consequently, if one of the |F (w)|, |F (w + e1)|, |F (w + e2)|, · · · ,
|F (w + ep−1)| equals p(n+1)/2 the others equal zero, which implies that F (w) corresponds
to the Walsh transform of an n + 1 bent function.
CHAPTER 3
Cryptanalysis of a Public Key
Cryptosystem Based on Boolean
Permutations
Several attempts were made to construct public key cryptosystems based on Boolean per-
mutations. Wu and Varadharajan [53] proposed three such constructions (PKC1, PKC2
and PKC3) whose security is based on the difﬁculty of inverting a special class of trapdoor
Boolean permutations that can be constructed efﬁciently. In this chapter, we analyze the
security of the PCK2 family proposed by Wu and Varadharajan. In particular, we show
that the suggested construction for the PCK2 family is insecure and we present an efﬁcient
cryptanalytic attack that allows the cryptanalyst to invert the class of Boolean permutations
used in PCK2 without the knowledge of the secret key parameters.
3.1 Introduction
Traditional public key systems [1] can be categorized, based on the underlying hard prob-
lem, into discrete logarithm-based, such as Difﬁe-Hellman, DSA and their elliptic curve
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variants, or integer factorization-based such as the RSA algorithm. Despite the signiﬁ-
cant progress that has been made in implementing these systems, the computational cost
associated with them remain somewhat expensive, especially in resource constrained envi-
ronments. For example, a typical public key algorithm might involve about 500,000 32-bit
multiplications which can take up to 5 seconds on low-end chips [54].
To address this problem, several attempts were made to construct public key cryp-
tosystems based on trapdoor Boolean permutations that can be implemented efﬁciently
(e.g. [55]- [56]). Any cryptosystem, without expansion, can be seen as a Boolean permuta-
tion which can be seen as a collection of Boolean functions.
Generally, ﬁnding the inverse of a nonlinear Boolean permutation is an NP-complete
problem, which is equivalent to solving a set of nonlinear Boolean equations. The main idea
behind designing trapdoor Boolean permutations is to ﬁnd a class of efﬁciently computable
random-looking permutations with compact representation, which can be easily inverted
given some trapdoor information and, yet, are hard to invert without this information. If
such a trapdoor Boolean permutation is constructed, then it is easily to design a public key
cryptosystem in which the trapdoor information corresponds to the receiver’s private key.
In [53], Wu and Varadharajan proposed three families of Boolean permutation based
public key cryptosystems (PKC1, PKC2 and PKC3). In this chapter, we focus on the
security of PKC2. It should be noted that PKC1 was not fully speciﬁed in [53] which
makes it hard to present a speciﬁc attack against it. Also, our attack does not apply to
PKC3, since its security also relies on the difﬁculty of decoding random codes.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we review some prelimi-
naries related to PKC2 and our attack against it. The relevant details of PKC2 are reviewed
in section 3.3. Our proposed attack is presented in section 3.4 and then provide numerical
example in section 3.5.
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3.2 Construction of Boolean permutation
A mapping from Fn2 to F
m
2 is called an (n,m)-Boolean function. An (n,m)-Boolean func-
tion can be expressed as a collection of m Boolean functions with n variables. A special
class of this mapping called a Boolean permutation occurs when m = n and yields a one-
to-one mapping between the inputs and the outputs. A Boolean permutation of order n can
be expressed as a collection of Boolean functions of n variables and it is written as
P (x) = [p1(x), · · · , pn(x)]. (3.1)
If all the functions p1(x), · · · , pn(x) are of algebraic degree one, we call P (x) a linear
Boolean permutation.
Lemma 3.1. Let li(x) = ai0
⊕
ai1x1
⊕ · · ·⊕ ainxn, aij ∈ F2, i = 1, · · · , n. Let A =
[aij ], i, j = 1, · · · , n, be the matrix of coefﬁcients. Then L = [l1, · · · , ln] forms a linear
Boolean permutation if and only if A is nonsingular.
The following algorithm [53] can be used to construct a Boolean permutation of order
n + 1 from a Boolean permutation of order n.
Algorithm 1
Let P (x) = [p1(x), · · · , pn(x)], x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Fn2 be a Boolean permutation of order
n. Set qi(x, xn+1) = pi(x)⊕ xn+1 ⊕ g(x), i = 1, · · · , n, and qn+1(x, xn−1) = xn+1 ⊕ g(x),
xn ∈ F2. Then Q = [q1, · · · , qn+1] is a Boolean permutation of order n + 1.
Algorithm 1 is an iterative construction method which requires an initial Boolean per-
mutation. One approach is to select an arbitrary Boolean function of small order as the
initial one. Apparently, when n becomes larger this construction tends to be inefﬁcient,
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since the initial permutation of order n is still large and hard to present efﬁciently. There-
fore, the authors in [53] suggested the use of a linear Boolean permutation to initialize
Algorithm 1 since linear permutations are simple to construct for any order. The algorithm
can be iterated several times until we reach to the required order. It should be noted that a
different nonlinear function gi(x) is chosen for every algorithm run.
In general, ﬁnding the inverse of a nonlinear Boolean permutation is equivalent to solv-
ing a set of nonlinear Boolean equations which is an NP-complete problem. In [53], the
authors presented an efﬁcient algorithm to obtain the inverse of P constructed by Algorithm
1 given the knowledge of the initial permutation and the functions gi’s.
3.3 Description of PKC2 proposed byWu and Varadhara-
jan
Let A be an arbitrary binary matrix with dimensions k × n and rank(A) = k. Choose two
matrices S and B with dimension n× k and (n− k)× n respectively, such that
A S = Ik and B S = 0 (3.2)
One way of obtaining such S, A and B [53] is to choose an arbitrary n× n nonsingular
matrix G, then let A be composed of the ﬁrst k rows of G and B be composed of the
remaining n− k rows and let S be composed of the ﬁrst most left k columns of G−1.
By iterating Algorithm 1, construct a Boolean permutation P = [p1(x), · · · , pk(x)]
of order k, keeping its inverse P−1 as secret. Let R = [r1, · · · , rn−k] be a collection of
arbitrary Boolean functions.
The tuple (A,B, P ) as constructed above combined with R is used to construct the
public key as
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Q = P A⊕R B (3.3)
The corresponding private key is given by P−1(·). The ciphertext corresponding to a
k-bit message m is given by
c = Q(m) (3.4)
The decryption of the ciphertext c is given by
m = P−1(c S) (3.5)
The public key Q is a set of n Boolean functions of k variables [q1(x), · · · , qn(x)] while
the private key is a collection of k Boolean functions of n variables. Figure. 3.1 depicts


































Figure 3.1: Block Diagram of PKC2 Encryption
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3.4 The proposed attack
Recall that the ciphetext c corresponding to a message m is given by
c = Q(m) = P (m) A⊕R(m) B (3.6)
Multiplying both sides of the above equation by S, we obtain
c S = P (m) A S⊕R(m) B S = P (m) I⊕ 0 = P (m). (3.7)
The above equation implies that
c · stri = pi(m), i = 1, · · · k, (3.8)
where stri denotes the transpose of the ith column of S. Let m′ = (m1,m2, · · · ,mk−T ).
Assuming that P is constructed by iterating Algorithm 1 above for T times and starting
from a linear permutation (see Lemma 3.1), then we can form the following system of
n− (T − 1) equations
c · (s1 ⊕ si) = p1(m′)⊕ pi(m′) = (a1 ⊕ ai) ·m′, i = 2, · · ·n− T. (3.9)
The above equation implies that certain linear combinations of the ciphertext bits can be
expressed as a linear combination of the plaintext bits. It should be noted that the number
of non zero terms in the ANF description of Q has to be kept small, otherwise the public
key size will become impractical. Hence, given the ANF description of the public key, i.e.,
the ANF of qi, i = 1, · · ·n, the Gaussian elimination (as shown by Algorithm 2 below)
can be used to efﬁciently determine the subsets of the Q coordinates whose XOR yields a
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linear function in the plaintext message bits.
Algorithm 2
(1) Let W denote the matrix whose ith row corresponds to the nonlinear terms in the
ANF representation of qi. Let O denote the matrix obtained from W by removing all
the zero columns from W.
(2) Let L = [O|I] where I denotes the identity matrix
(3) Run the Gaussian elimination algorithm to ﬁnd the linearly dependent rows in L.
(4) Form a set of linear equations between m and c from the linearly dependent qi’s.
It should be noted that the above systems of equations can be formed off-line. Then
we can solve for the plaintext corresponding to any given ciphertext by substituting the ci’s
values into qi’s and solving for m. From (3.9), the rank, r, of the linear equations will be
equal to r = k − T . This allows us to recover k − T bits from the plaintext message. The
remaining T bits can be recovered by assuming some values for them and checking the
corresponding ciphertext using the known public key. It should be noted that in order to
keep the size of the public key reasonably small, T has to be kept relatively small which
consequently ensures the efﬁciency of our attack. A illustrative example that demonstrates
the steps described in the above attack is given in the next section.
3.5 Numerical example
Consider PKC2 with k = 5, n = 7,




























Let P be obtained by running Algorithm 1 for one time, starting from the linear permutation
l(x1, · · · , x4) = [x1, x2, x3, x4] and using nonlinear function g as follows g(x1, · · · , x4) =
x1 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x1x2x3 ⊕ x1x4 ⊕ x1x2x4 ⊕ x1x3x4 ⊕ x1x2x3x4.
Let R(x) = [r1(x), r2(x)] where
r1(x1, · · · , x4) = x1⊕x4⊕x1x4⊕x1x2x3x4⊕x2x5⊕x1x2x5⊕x3x5⊕x1x3x5⊕x1x2x3x5⊕
x4x5⊕ x2x4x5 ⊕x1x2x4x5.
r2(x1, · · · , x4) = 1⊕x1⊕x2⊕x1x2x3⊕x4⊕x1x4⊕x1x3x4⊕x2x3x4⊕x5⊕x3x5⊕x1x3x5⊕
x1x4x5 ⊕ x2x4x5 ⊕ x1x3x4x5.
Then the ANF of the coordinates of the public key Q = P A⊕R B are given by
q1(x1, · · · , x5) = x1⊕ x2⊕ x2x3⊕ x1x2x3⊕ x1x4⊕ x1x2x4⊕ x1x3x4⊕ x1x2x3x4⊕ x5.
q2(x1, · · · , x5) = x3⊕x1x4⊕x1x2x3x4⊕x2x5⊕x1x2x5⊕x3x5⊕x1x3x5⊕x1x2x3x5⊕x4x5
⊕x2x4x5 ⊕ x1x2x4x5.
q3(x1, · · · , x5) = 1⊕x1⊕x2x3⊕x1x4⊕x1x2x4⊕x2x3x4⊕x2x5⊕x1x2x5⊕x1x2x3x5⊕x4x5
⊕x1x4x5 ⊕ x1x2x4x5 ⊕ x1x3x4x5.
q4(x1, · · · , x5) = 1⊕x3⊕x1x2x3⊕x1x3x4⊕x2x3x4⊕x1x2x3x4⊕x5⊕x2x5⊕x1x2x5⊕
x1x2x3x5 ⊕ x4x5 ⊕ x1x4x5 ⊕ x1x2x4x5 ⊕ x1x3x4x5.
q5(x1, · · · , x5) = 1⊕x1⊕x2⊕x3⊕x1x2x3⊕x4⊕x1x4⊕x1x3x4⊕x2x3x4⊕x5⊕x3x5⊕
x1x3x5 ⊕ x1x4x5 ⊕ x2x4x5 ⊕ x1x3x4x5.
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q6(x1, · · · , x5) = x1⊕x4⊕x1x4⊕x1x2x3x4⊕x2x5⊕x1x2x5⊕x3x5⊕x1x3x5⊕x1x2x3x5⊕
x4x5 ⊕ x2x4x5 ⊕ x1x2x4x5.
q7(x1, · · · , x5) = x1⊕x2⊕x3⊕x2x3⊕x1x2x3⊕x4⊕x1x2x4⊕x1x3x4⊕x5⊕x2x5⊕x1x2x5
⊕x3x5 ⊕ x1x3x5 ⊕ x1x2x3x5 ⊕ x4x5 ⊕ x2x4x5 ⊕ x1x2x4x5.
Using Algorithm 2, our attack proceeds as follows:


























































































































































0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦




1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Note that in practice we do not need to construct W, i.e., only O needs to be
constructed.




q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(3) After running the Gaussian elimination we get
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
eq1: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
eq2: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
eq3: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
eq4: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4) The zero rows corresponds to the linearly dependent rows in Q as follows
eq1 ⇒ q1(x)⊕ q3(x)⊕ q4(x) = x2 ⊕ x3 ⇒ c1 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c4 = m2 ⊕m3.
eq2 ⇒ q2(x) ⊕ q4(x) ⊕ q5(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⇒ c2 ⊕ c4 ⊕ c5 =
m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 ⊕m4.
eq3 ⇒ q3(x)⊕ q5(x)⊕ q7(x) = x1 ⇒ c3 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c7 = m1.
eq4 ⇒ q4(x)⊕ q5(x)⊕ q6(x) = x2 ⇒ c4 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c6 = m2.
Given the known-ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , c7) = (1101101), we solve the above linear
equations to get plaintext m = (m1, . . . ,m4) = (0001). m5 = 1 can be obtained by en-
crypting (0001m′5),m
′
5 ∈ F2, using the known public key, and checking the corresponding
ciphertext.
CHAPTER 4
Image Encryption Schemes Based on
Multiple Parameters Transforms
Recent developments of generalized forms of signal processing transforms with a large
number of independent parameters, such as the Multiple Parameter Fractional Fourier
Transform and the Discrete Fractional Cosine Transform, have led many researchers to
propose image encryption algorithms based on a single or multiple applications of these
transforms. In order to claim a high level of security of these parameterized transforms-
based schemes, their authors usually use the argument that the encrypted image is visually
indistinguishable from random noise.
In this chapter, we show that these algorithms represent typical examples of insecure
ciphers. All the building blocks of these schemes are linear, and hence, breaking these
scheme, using a known plaintext attack, is equivalent to solving a set of linear equations.
We also invalidate the argument of relying on the visual quality of the encrypted image
ciphertext by presenting an example for a trivially insecure system that produces cipher-
text images with the same property. An argument against the claimed efﬁciency of these




Mathematical transforms, such as Fourier, Cosine, and Wavelets, have long been power-
ful tools for signal representation, analysis and processing. The discrete forms of these
transforms have been widely applied to many domains including image processing.
Motivated by the wide available spectrum of possible applications, these transforms
have been generalized. For example, the Fractional Fourier Transform (FRFT) [9] has
been proposed as a generalization for the Fourier transform. The Fourier transform can be
interpreted as a transform of a time domain signal into a frequency domain signal. Sim-
ilarly, the interpretation of the inverse Fourier transform is as a transform of a frequency
domain signal into a time domain signal. The FRFT, on the other hand, transforms a sig-
nal, either in the time domain or frequency domain, into the domain between time and
frequency; it is a rotation in the time-frequency domain. The FRFT can be thought of as
the Fourier transform to the nth power, where it transforms a function to an intermediate
domain between time and frequency. Its applications range from ﬁlter design and signal
analysis to phase retrieval and pattern recognition. Unnikrishnan et al. [57] also proposed
optical image encryption with FRFT.
With the increasing applications of FRFT, researchers have put numerous efforts on
the development of its theory. Consequently, a variety of different forms of FRFTs were
deﬁned, which enriched the applications of these transforms. Zhu et al. [10] constructed
a Multiple Fractional Fourier Transform (MFRFT) as a linear combination of the conven-
tional FRFT. Afterward, Liu et al. [11] proposed the Random Fractional Fourier Transform
(RFRFT) by randomizing the transform kernel function of the conventional FRFT. Later,
Tao et al. [58] proposed the Multiple-Parameter Fractional Fourier Transform (MPFRFT)
by using the fractionalized method from Shih [59]. Following ideas from the FRFT, a se-
ries of transforms, such as Fractional Cosine Transform (FCT) [12], Fractional Hadamard
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Transform (FRHaT) [13], and Fractional Random Transform (FRT) [60], have been pro-
posed.
A common feature of these generalized transforms is that they have a relatively larger
number of independent parameters as compared to their corresponding original forms. Re-
constructing the original signal from the transformed domain requires the application of
the inverse transform with the exact set of parameters corresponding to the ones that were
applied to the original signal. Any simple modiﬁcation in these parameters would lead to
the reconstruction of a completely distorted version of the signal. These observations have
encouraged many researchers to propose image encryption algorithms based on a single or
multiple steps of these transforms, where the parameters of these transforms are used as
encryption keys. A quick review of the relevant signal processing literature would reveal
a surprisingly very large number of image encryption schemes based on these transforms.
For example, [61], [62] and [63] propose similar systems based on the Discrete Fractional
Fourier Transform (DFRFT). To increase the number of the transform parameters, the au-
thors in [64] introduced the Discrete Multiple Parameter Fractional Fourier Transform
(DMPFRFT) and then proposed an image encryption algorithm based on it. Nu et al. [65]
proposed an image encryption system based on the Mixed Discrete Fourier Transformation
(MxDFT) in which the constructed transform matrix is represented as a linear combina-
tion of more than one DFRFT. To add more randomness to encrypted images whose en-
ergy concentrates around the corners or borders, the Random Discrete Fractional Fourier
Transform (RDFRFT) was proposed in [15]. The eigenvectors of the kernel matrix of the
RDFRFT are random DFT eigenvectors that are computed from eigenvectors of a random
DFT-commuting matrix. Several discrete Fourier-related transforms have been parameter-
ized in order to design image encryption algorithms. For example, Zhou et al. [66] present
an image encryption system using the Discrete Parametric Cosine Transform (DPCT) and
Tao et al. [13] present another system based on the Multiple-Parameter Discrete Fractional
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Hadamard Transform (MPDFrHaT).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy review
the details of three representative samples of these image encryption schemes which are
based on RDFRFT [15], Multi Orders Fractional Fourier Transforms [16] and Reciprocal-
Orthogonal Parametric (ROP) Transform [17], respectively. In Section 4.3, we present
our main observations about these schemes: all these schemes are linear and hence they
can be trivially broken using a known plaintext attack. We also show that relying on the
visual quality of the encrypted image does not provide any rigorous proof of security for
the underlying system and we discuss the claimed efﬁciency of these schemes.
4.2 Examples of image encryption algorithms based on
multiple parameters transforms
In this section, we brieﬂy summarize three representative examples of the image encryption
algorithms that are based on parameterized discrete transforms.
Image encryption based on RDFRFT [15]




e−j(2π/N)mn, 0 ≤ m,n ≤ N − 1. (4.1)





where e0, e1, · · · , eN−1 form an orthonormal eigenvector basis of the DFT.
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A generalization of DFRFT, called the Discrete Multiple Parameters Fractional Fourier







where a¯ = [a0, a1, · · · , aN−1].
The RDFRFT [15] with 1 × N parameter vector a¯ is obtained by using the random







where rk are the orthonormal random DFT eigenvectors computed from H, and λk is the
DFT eigenvalue corresponding to rk. The reader is referred to [15] for the steps of obtaining
matrix H.
Finally, the 2-D RDFRFT image encryption with secret key parameters (a¯1, H1, a¯2, H2)
of an N ×M image P is deﬁned by
Q = Fa¯1H1 · P · Fa¯2H2 , (4.6)
whereQ is the encrypted image and Fa¯1H1 , F
a¯2
H2 are theN×N andM×M RDFRFTmatrices,
respectively.
Image encryption based on the multi-orders fractional Fourier transform [16]
The N ×N of the p-th order DFRFT is deﬁned as
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FNp = Λ
N
p,u ·WN ·ΛNp,t, (4.7)
where the matrices FNp ,W
N ∈ CN×N and the diagonal matrices ΛNp,u,ΛNp,t ∈ CN×N are
deﬁned as

















where p ∈ (0, 2), Δt is the sampling intervals in the time domain, and Δup = 2π sin(pπ/2)/
(NΔt) is the p-th order of Fractional Fourier domain (FRFD). Correspondingly, the p-th
order of the inverse DFRFT for an N -length sequence, which is equivalent to the p-th order





= ΛN−p,t · (WN)H ·ΛN−p,u. (4.8)
The encryption is carried as follows: The A×B original image P is divided intoM×N
sub-images, Pa,b, a = 1, 2, · · · ,M and b = 1, 2, · · · , N , with a size of A/M×B/N , which
are given by
[Pa,b]m,n = [P](a−1)A/M+m,(b−1)B/N+n. (4.9)
If the column vectors of Pa,b are M -fold interpolated and further pa,b,a-th order inverse
discrete fractional Fourier transformed, then we can obtain the encrypted sub-images Qa,b,
based on the FRFD analysis of the interpolation [67, 68], as










Xa,b[Epa,b,2,0 Epa,b,2,1 · · · Epa,b,2,N−1], (4.10)
where the matrix Xa,b ∈ C(A/M)×(B/N) is the two dimensional inverse DFRFT of Pa,b,
which is given by
Xa,b = F
A/M
−pa,b,1 · Pa,b · (FB/N−pa,b,2)T .
The diagonal matrices Dpa,b,1,l ∈ C(A/M)×(A/M), l = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1 and Epa,b,2,k ∈
C






















Image encryption based on the ROP transform [17]





then n is called a minus integer. The rows of any N × N matrix are indexed by integer
numbers 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. A row indexed by a minus integer is called a minus-indexed row.
The Reciprocal-Orthogonal Parametric (ROP) N × N matrix is constructed using a
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parametric row vector V of length N and Hadamard matrix H of order N .
Throughout the rest of this section, we use a toy example with N = 4 to illustrate the
basic principles of this scheme. The construction of the ROP transform matrix proceeds as
follows,
- Form a parametric row vector V = [1 a1 a1 1], with the parameter a1 is nonzero scalar
and arbitrarily chosen from the complex plane.




1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1
1 1 −1 −1




which has four rows that can be indexed from the top to the bottom by 0, 1, 2, 3. In this
case, the minus-indexed rows are those that are indexed by 1 and 2. By performing an
element-by-element multiplication of each of these minus-indexed rows by the parametric




1 1 1 1
1 −a1 a1 −1
1 a1 −a1 −1




Let us denote by TViN the ROP transform matrix of order N constructed using the para-
metric vector Vi, which has N/2 − 1 independent parameters. Then, we consider four





N , and T
V4
N , respectively.
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The output of the ﬁrst round is obtained as
C = TV2N (P [ejα(n,m)])TV1N , (4.12)




TV4N (C [ejβ(n,m)])TV3N , (4.13)
where  denotes the element-by-element multiplication operation of matrices, [ejα(n,m)]
and [ejβ(n,m)] are twoN×N random phase matrices, α(n,m) and β(n,m), 1 ≤ n,m ≤ N ,
are white, uniformly distributed in [0, 2π] and independent of each other. The (2N − 4)




N , and T
V4
N and the
random phase matrices are used as the encryption secret keys. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show
























































Figure 4.2: Decryption process based on ROP transform domain.
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4.3 Main observations
An introduction to different types of cryptanalytic attacks can be found in [69]. A more
rigorous mathematical treatment can be found in [1]. The attack described here is a known
plaintext attack, i.e., we assume that the cryptanalyst can observe some of the plaintext im-
ages and its corresponding encrypted ciphertext. One should note that, because of the large
size of the key required to encrypt an image using these multiple parameter transforms, the
assumption that the same encryption key will be used to encrypt several images is realistic;
otherwise, the user is better off using the theoretically secure one-time pad algorithm [1].
4.3.1 Known plaintext attack
Despite the apparent complexity of some of the above generalized transforms, a common
feature in all of them is that there is an equivalent matrix description for each one of them.
In order to avoid unnecessary mathematical notation, consider the toy example of the



































a11b11 a11b21 a12b11 a12b21
a11b12 a11b22 a12b12 a12b22
a21b11 a21b21 a22b11 a22b21
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By noting that the decomposition of linear systems is linear. Similar relation follow for
the two other systems presented in Section 2. Also, adding an arbitrary large number of
rounds would not add any nonlinearity to these schemes. Consider an N ×M image P. Let
INM×1 and ONM×1 denote the column-vectors obtained by concatenating the elements of
the input plaintext matrix, P, and the output ciphertext matrix, Q, respectively. Then, for
all the above encryption systems, we have
O = K× I (4.14)
where K is an NM × NM equivalent key matrix whose elements can be recovered us-
ing O(NM) known plaintext-ciphettext pairs. While the complexity of solving the above
system of equations using Gaussian elimination is given by O((NM)3), other more ad-
vanced techniques can reduce this complexity to O((NM)2.37). It should be noted that this
complexity is much less than the usually claimed security level of these systems.
A folklore argument that is typically presented by the authors of image encryption
schemes based on parameterized discrete transforms is that their proposed schemes are
more secure than others because their underlying transforms utilize a larger number of
transform parameters which increases the length of the corresponding secret keys. For
example, the DMPFRFT-based scheme in [70] claim better security than DFRFT because
it uses more parameters compared to the DFRFT.
Contrary to the above folklore argument, when considering this basic forms of known
plaintext attacks, an encryption system based on a generalized transform with a huge num-
ber of parameters is equally as bad as any transform with very small number of parameters;
both of them can be broken with the same complexity. Similarly, adding an arbitrary large
number of transform rounds would not increase the security of these schemes.
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4.3.2 Visual quality of encrypted images
In order to claim a high level of security of these parameterized transforms-based schemes,
their authors usually use the argument that the encrypted images are visually indistinguish-
able from random noise. While this is a necessary condition for any secure image encryp-
tion system, this condition is so loose to the extent that it can be satisﬁed by almost any
system, even if it has a very poor security. Verifying the security of any image encryption
scheme by visual observation is worthless practice; seeing a total random image as an en-
crypted image of the encryption scheme does not provide any assurance that the proposed
algorithm is secure. As an illustration of this observation, Figure 4.4 shows the encrypted
image using 11-bit Linear Feedback Shift register-based stream cipher (ciphertext only at-
tack against this LFSR cipher, using the Berlekamp Massey algorithm [1], requires only
22 bits.) In fact, as depicted in Figure 4.3, this trivially insecure 11-bit LFSR shows better
key avalanche properties when compared to some published schemes. It should be noted
that the existence of such a high correlation between images decrypted with slightly incor-
rect keys and the original images may also facilitate ciphertext only attacks using heuristic
search techniques.
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(a) Original Barbara (b) Decrypted with incorrect key
(c) Original Lena (d) Decrypted with incorrect key
Figure 4.3: Examples of images decrypted with slightly incorrect keys for the ROP-based
algorithm.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.4: (a) Lena, (b) Lena encrypted by an LFSR, (c) Lena decrypted with a slightly
incorrect key (1 bit difference).
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4.3.3 Inefﬁciency of the proposed schemes
Due to the large data size and real-time constraints of multimedia data, some researchers
argue that standard encryption algorithms may not be suitable for multimedia data. In fact,
this reason is usually used as the main motivation for many parameterized transform based
image encryption systems. However, since all the elements of the matrices corresponding
to these parameterized transforms are complex numbers, the encryption process requires
ﬂoating point operations which are much slower than the typical operations required by
modern symmetric key ciphers. Also, there is usually a large data expansion associated
with the encryption process because, unlike the plaintext, the ciphertext belongs to the
set of complex numbers (which typically means an expansion by a 1 : 8 factor.) Thus,
current standard algorithms such as AES [3] outperform the above systems in terms of
both encryption speed, bandwidth, and storage requirements.
CHAPTER 5
Secret Sharing Approaches for Images
and 3D Objects
5.1 Introduction
The ongoing developments in computer technologies and the rapid increase in the number
of Internet users have led to increasing the usage of network-based data transmission. In
numerous applications, such as military documents and sensitive business data, this infor-
mation must be kept secret and safe. Recently, 2D images and 3D models are considered as
important as any other sensitive information. As a result, several 2D image-protection tech-
niques, such as data encryption [71, 72] and steganography [73, 74], have been proposed
to increase the security of 2D images. One common disadvantage of traditional protection
techniques, such as encryption, is their policy of centralized storage. An entire protected
model is usually maintained in a single information storage. If an intruder detects security
vulnerability in the information storage in which the protected model resides, then s/he
may attempt to decipher the secret model inside, or simply damage the entire information
storage. Secret sharing is a defense mechanism that does not suffer from these problems.
It works by splitting the secret into n shares that are transmitted and stored separately. One
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can then reconstruct the original secret if at least a preset number t (1 ≤ t ≤ n) of these n
shares are obtained. However, knowledge of less than t shares is insufﬁcient for revealing
the secret.
The idea of secret sharing was introduced independently in [18] and [75]. These
schemes are based on the use of Lagrange interpolation polynomial and the intersection of
afﬁne hyperplanes, respectively. Since then, several studies have investigated the different
implementations of the (t, n)-threshold scheme by mainly concentrating on secret sharing
of keys in cipher systems. Most of these schemes are based on different mathematical
primitives, such as matrix theory and prime numbers [1]. These protocols are speciﬁcally
designed for text and numeric data. Due to the main distinctive nature of multimedia, in
the sense that they have a large amount of data and the difference between two neighbor-
ing values is typically very small, it is considerably difﬁcult to directly apply traditional
secret sharing schemes to digital images or 3D objects. Thus, various secret sharing proto-
cols have been designed exclusively for digital images based on vector quantization [76],
Shamir-based schemes [77–79], sharing circle [80, 81], binary matrices [82], or cellular
automata [83, 84]. Just a few of these schemes generate shares that have smaller sizes than
the original image. The method proposed in [78] generates shares of 1/t the size of the
secret image, whereas the method proposed in [77], that involves using Huffman coding
scheme, generates shared images 40% smaller than that of the approach in [78].
Recently, ﬂurry of research efforts has been carried out to design secure and efﬁcient
approaches for 2D image protection. However, 3D models have received less attention due
to the fact that 2D image algorithms do not generally extend to 3D models. Besides, the
rapid development in computer and information technology has increased the use of 3D
models in various application domains, including manufacturing industries, entertainment
and even in the military. Thus, the need for protection techniques to keep these 3D models
secret and safe is of paramount importance. Inspired by the successful application of image
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secret sharing schemes, in this chapter, we propose two secret sharing approaches for 3D
models using Blakely scheme [75] and Thien & Lin [78]. We then show that encoding the
3D models using Huffman coding [85] or ZLIB [86] prior to secret sharing reduces the
shares sizes signiﬁcantly.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we describe the image
secret sharing scheme proposed in [82], and then we present the theoretical steps to recover
the secret image from a single share only. We also provide experimental results on different
images to validate the effectiveness of the recovering process. In Section 5.3, we review the
3D triangle mesh deﬁnition and the traditional secret sharing schemes. Then, we propose
two secret sharing approaches for 3D models and describe their algorithmic steps. Finally,
we apply the proposed approaches to various 3D models to demonstrate their effectiveness.
5.2 Matrix-based secret sharing scheme for images
Several attempts have been made to propose efﬁcient secret sharing schemes for 2D images.
The scheme proposed in [82] is a relatively fast image secret sharing scheme based on
simple binary matrix operations. In this section, we show that care should be taken when
choosing the matrices that corresponds to the shares. In particular if the rank of these
singular matrices is not low enough then one can recover the secret image from only one
share. Experimental results are provided to demonstrate the practicality of the recovery
procedure on various 2D images.
5.2.1 (2, n)-threshold matrix-based image secret sharing scheme
The proposed secret sharing scheme in [82] is based on binary operations of two matrices
A and B that satisfy the following algebraic property. Let A and B be two binary matrices
such that A
⊕
B = Id. Then the following theorem holds
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Theorem 5.1. Am ⊕Bm = I if and only if m = 2e, with e ∈ Z+
The reader can refer to [82] for the proof of theorem 5.1.
The steps of the image secret sharing scheme proposed in [82] are described as follows,
The setup phase. Let the matrix J = (pi,j) be a gray-level image deﬁned by n × n





i,j, · · · , q8i,j) ∈ Z82, with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Consequently, eight binary matrices
with coefﬁcients in Z2 are extracted from J = (qki,j), where 1 ≤ k ≤ 8. For simplicity,
we write J = J1‖J2‖ . . . ‖J8 as a concatenation of eight binary matrices, where each of
them represents a black and white subimage. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 correspond to Lena gray
image deﬁned by 128× 128 pixels and its eight subimages, respectively.
The sharing phase. We choose two singular binary matrices A and B satisfying Theorem
5.1. Then, we randomly choose n/2 integer numbers e1 ≤ e2 ≤ . . . ≤ en/2 and computes
mi = 2
ei . The shares S1i , S
2








mi · J1‖Bmi · J2‖ · · · ‖Bmi · J8.
(5.1)
The recovery phase. The users P 1i and P 2i combine their shares, S1i , S2i , and compute the
original image as follows,
J = (Ami · J1)⊕ (Bmi · J1)‖(Ami · J2)⊕ (Bmi · J2)‖ · · · ‖(Ami · J8)⊕ (Bmi · J8).
The drawback of this scheme is that every participant P 1i has only one qualiﬁed partici-
pant from the pool of participants that s/he can collude to recover the original image. If the
share of the qualiﬁed participant P 2i is altered or modiﬁed, the participant P
1
i will never be
able to recover the original image.
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To overcome this drawback, the author in [82] proposed a generalization of the above
scheme, such that any participant P 1i can combine his share with any other participant
P 2j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n/2 to recover the secret image. The generalization of the protocol is
exactly the same as the basic one except for the sharing phase where the data {S1i ,mi =
2ei}, {S2i ,mi = 2ei} are distributed to the participants P 1i , P 2i respectively. Finally, in the
recovery phase, the participants P 1i , P
2
j recover the secret J image as follows:
i) Compare the integer numbers mi and mj .
If mi < mj , P 1i computes
Ami+mj−mi · J1‖ · · · ‖Ami+mj−mi · J8 = Amj · J1‖ · · · ‖Amj · J8,
Otherwise, if mi > mj , P 2j computes
Bmj+mi−mj · J1‖ · · · ‖Bmj+mi−mj · J8 = Bmi · J1‖ · · · ‖Bmi · J8.
ii) The recovery of the original image is carried as follows
J = (Amj · J1)⊕ (Bmj · J1)‖ · · · ‖(Amj · J8)⊕ (Bmj · J8)
or
J = (Ami · J1)⊕ (Bmi · J1)‖ · · · ‖(Ami · J8)⊕ (Bmi · J8)
We should highlight here that in order for the participants P 1i and P
2
j to carry out the
recovery phase of the generalized scheme, they must know the matrices A and B.
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Figure 5.1: 128× 128 Lena gray image.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 5.2: (a) Subimage J1, (b) Subimage J2, (c) Subimage J3, (d) Subimage J4, (e)
Subimage J5, (f) Subimage J6, (g) Subimage J7, (h) Subimage J8.
We should note that the most signiﬁcant bits of the 8-bit values of grey images are the
most important bits. One can distinguish the original image from the ﬁrst subimages. For
instance, as depicted in Figure 5.2 if we can recover J1 or J2 even partly we can recognize
the original image. Secret sharing schemes based on the above idea should satisfy the
following indistinguishability property: Given the secret share, one matrix should not be
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able to distinguish this share from a random binary matrix of the same dimension, which is
similar to the notion of semantic security in cryptography.
5.2.2 Recovering the original image from a single share
It is proven in ( [87], Ch. A.3.3) that a real-valued matrix ﬁlled with independent and
identically distributed random variables, with continuous probability distribution function,
will be singular with probability zero. On the contrary, in GF (2) the probability a square
random binary matrix is singular as its dimension tends to inﬁnity is 71.1% [88].
The scheme proposed in [82] stated that the random matrices A and B must be singular
without specifying the value of the ranks. Furthermore, generating a singular binary matrix
randomly will produce a matrix that has high rank with high probability. Consequently,
solving a set of linear equations when the coefﬁcient matrix has a high rank will result in
decreasing the number of independent/depended variables and increasing the number of
determined variables.
The main weakness in the generalization of the image secret sharing scheme proposed
in [82] is that for the participants to reconstruct the secret image they must know A and B
along with the integer numbers mi and mj . For instance, the participants P 1i and P
2
j must
know (A, B, mi, mj) to perform the comparison between mi and mj and the computation
Ami+mj−mi ·J1‖ · · · ‖Ami+mj−mi ·J8 or Bmj+mi−mj ·J1‖ · · · ‖Bmj+mi−mj ·J8, as stated
in the generalization of the scheme.
To recover the original n×n gray image from a single share, the participant P 1i has his
share S1i = A
mi · J1‖ · · · ‖Ami · J8 and knows A and mi. Then, he perform the following
to recover J1,
Let A = (ai,j), J1 = (Ji,j) and Ami · J1 = (si,j). Calculate Ami = (aˆi,j), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
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and form the set of linear Boolean equations as follows,

















We have n × n binary linear equations with n × n variables. Solving this set of linear
equations will produce determined variables (pixels) with speciﬁc values, depended vari-
ables, and independent variables which we can assign any value to them. Due to the nature
of the image, there is no need to ﬁnd the exact values of all the pixels. With only small
percentage of the correct values of the pixels, we can distinguish the original image, as we
can see from the recovered J1 and J2 in Figure 5.3. To recover the original gray image,
we perform the previous recovery steps to all eight subimages and then concatenate them
together.
5.2.3 Experimental results
We applied the recovery technique on different 128× 128 gray images, namely, Lena, F16
and Fishing boat. The singular binary matrix A was chosen randomly with a rank equals
127 and the integer number mi equals 2. We used the BooleanPolynomial class from
the SAGE [89] package to do the fast calculations for solving the set of linear Boolean
equations depending on 128 × 128 binary variables. As an example in the case of Lena,
after solving the set of linear binary equations, the number of undetermined variables was
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12928, which were set to zeros. On the other hand, the number of determined variables for
each of J1,J2 · · · ,J8 was 3456, which is the number of bits (pixels) that were recovered
exactly. Although this number seems too small comparing to 128 × 128 bits, it is enough
to recognize the original image easily as shown in Figure 5.3.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: The recovered subimages of Lena (a) J1, (b) J2.
One can see from Figures 5.4 and 5.5 the similarity between the recovered images and
the corresponding original images.



















































Figure 5.4: Original images of (a) Lena, (b) F16, (c) Fishing boat, (d)-(f) their histograms.






















































Figure 5.5: Recovered images of (a) Lena, (b) F16, (c) Fishing boat, (d)-(f) their his-
tograms.
5.3 Secret sharing approaches for 3D objects
Inspired by the successful application of image secret sharing schemes in multimedia pro-
tection, in this section we present two secret sharing approaches for 3D models using
Blakely and Thien & Lin schemes. We show that encoding 3D models using lossless data
compression algorithms prior to secret sharing helps reduce share sizes and remove redun-
dancies and patterns that possibly ease cryptanalysis. The proposed approaches provide a
higher tolerance against data corruption/ loss than existing 3D protection mechanisms, such
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as encryption. Experimental results are provided to demonstrate the secrecy and safety of
the proposed schemes. The feasibility of the proposed algorithms is demonstrated on vari-
ous 3D models.
5.3.1 Problem formulation
In computer graphics and geometric-aided design, 3D objects are usually represented as
polygonal or triangle meshes. A triangle mesh M is deﬁned as M = (V , T ) where V =
{v1, . . . ,vm} is the set of vertices and T = {t1, ..., t} is the set of triangles (faces) as














































Figure 5.6: Vertex neighborhood vi .
Secret sharing scheme is a method for distributing a secret amongst a group of partic-
ipants, each of which is given a share of the secret. The secret can only be reconstructed
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when the shares are combined together; individual shares are of no use on their own.
Blakley (t, n)-threshold scheme
The Blakley scheme uses hyperplane geometry to solve the secret sharing problem. The
secret is a point in a t-dimensional space. The n shares are constructed such that each share
is deﬁned as an afﬁne hyperplane that passes through the secret point. An afﬁne hyperplane
can be described by a linear equation of the following form a1x1 + . . . + atxt = b. The
intersection point is obtained by ﬁnding the intersection of any t of these hyperplanes. The
secret can be any of the coordinates of the intersection point or any function of the coordi-
nates.
For example, for a (3, n)-threshold scheme:
1. Choose a prime number p larger than the point coordinates.
2. Given a secret point (x0, y0, z0), n shares are generated as follows:
For each share:
2.1. Choose a, b ∈ Fp independently at random.
2.2. Let
c = z0 − ax0 − by0 mod p, (5.3)
where z = ax + by + c is the equation of a hyperplane.
Given any t hyperplanes, the secret point is the intersection point of these t hyperplanes.
Figure 5.7 illustrates how the three hyperplanes intersect in only one point (secret point).
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Figure 5.7: The secret point is the intersection point between the three planes.
The traditional Shamir and Blakley (t, n)-threshold schemes produce shares with same
size as the original secret. In multimedia, a secret can be an image or 3D model. Typically,
these ﬁles have a large amount of data. Thus, applying these traditional schemes may
be inefﬁcient in terms of the storage space. Consequently, several image secret sharing
approaches have been proposed to reduce the shares sizes. The method proposed in [78]
produces shares of 1/t the size of the secret image, whereas the Huffman coding-based
scheme introduced in [77] generates shared images 40% smaller than the method in [78].
Thien & Lin (t, n)-threshold scheme
Thien & Lin proposed a (t, n)-threshold-based approach using Shamir scheme [18] for
grayscale images to generate image shares. Suppose we want to divide the image S into
n image shares (S1, . . . , Sn), and the secret image S cannot be revealed without t or more
image shares. The essential idea is to use a polynomial of degree (t − 1) to construct n
image shares, by letting the t coefﬁcients be the gray values of t pixels. The main difference
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is that these coefﬁcients are randomly chosen in Shamir scheme. To this end, we ﬁrst divide
an image into several sections. Each section has t pixels of the image, and for each section
j, the following t− 1 degree polynomial is deﬁned
qj(x) = (a0 + a1x + . . . + at−1xt−1) mod p, (5.4)
where the coefﬁcients a0, a1, . . . , at−1 are the values of the t pixels of the section. Then
qj(1), qj(2), . . ., qj(n) are computed. These n values of the section are distributed to the
n participants to assign them sequentially to their n image shares. Since for each given
section (of t entries) of the secret image, each image share receives only one value of the
generated shares, the size of each image share is 1/t of the secret image. This method
reduces the size of image shares to become 1/t of the size of the secret image. We should
note here that since the gray values are between 0 and 255, the value of p was set to 251,
which is the greatest prime number less than 255. For this method to be valid, all the pixel
values greater than 250 must be rounded down to 250. Obviously, there will be some loss
in terms of pixel values during the reconstruction of the secret image. Thus, Thien & Lin
modiﬁed their technique to offer a lossless image secret sharing method. It should be noted
here that applying Thien & Lin’s scheme directly to the image shares can outline partially
the original secret image. Therefore, some sort of initial permutation is needed before
employing the scheme. Figure 5.8 illustrates Thien & Lin’s image secret sharing scheme,
where t = 2 and n = 4.




Figure 5.8: Thien & Lin’s secret sharing process for a Jet plane: (a) original image
512 × 512, (b)-(e) the four share images after the original image is permuted, each of
size 1/2 of the original image size.
5.3.2 Proposed 3D secret sharing schemes
Motivated by the successful application of image secret sharing schemes, we propose in
this section a secret sharing approaches for 3D models using Blakely scheme [75] and
Thien & Lin [78]. Later, we show that encoding the 3D models using Huffman coding [85]
or ZLIB [86] prior to splitting the secret reduces the shares sizes considerably.
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Algorithm: Proposed 3D secret sharing scheme
For the faces matrix T :
1. We choose pT as the next prime number larger than m.
2. For each i-th share, 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
(i) Select two random numbers independently ai, bi ∈ FpT .
(ii) Find ci using Eq.(5.3), where x, y, z are the values of the face and ai, bi, ci are the
coefﬁcients of the hyperplane equation z = aix + biy + ci.
(iii) Distribute the hyperplane equations (coefﬁcients) to all n participants.
3. Repeat step (2) for all  faces in T matrix.
Table 5.1: Algorithmic steps of the proposed approach.
3D sharing secret using Blakley scheme
Our proposed approach is motivated by Blakley secret sharing scheme. The main idea is
to split every vertex in the vertices matrix V and every face in the faces matrix T into
n share hyperplanes, where n > 3. Each share hyperplane is represented by an equation
z = ax+by+c. The main algorithmic steps of the proposed scheme are shown in Table 5.1.
In the recovery phase, the original values of the faces and vertices coordinates are the
intersection points between any three or more hyperplane equations. To be able to draw
the shares, all the calculations are performed in a prime ﬁeld FpT . This FpT is essential in
splitting the faces matrix T to ensure the coefﬁcients of the shared hyperplanes are within
the range of the number of vertices, i.e. less than m. Moreover, since all the values in
T are integers, FpT is necessary to avoid the prediction of the range of the faces original-
values from the shared-values. On the other hand, the modular operation in splitting the
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vertices matrix is not crucial. In this case, the scheme is still secure since the vertices
coordinates (vx, vy, vz) and the random coefﬁcients (ai, bi) are ﬂoating number, negative
numbers, and sometimes integers. For this reason, the values of the shares will not cor-
relate to the original-values of the vertices matrix. Thus, we apply the same algorithmic
steps to split the vertices matrix V , with the exception of using the prime ﬁeld. Knowing
the numbers of the vertices and faces of the share, the adversary can guess the share cor-
responds to which 3D model. To resist this statistical attack, we duplicate the last vertex
(resp. last face) to a random numbers prior to ﬁnding pT . Figure 5.9 shows how Blak-
ley scheme split the vertex v1 and face t1 of the 3D F15 ﬁghter jet model into four share
hyperplanes.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.9: Four planes generated by Blakley secret sharing scheme of F15 model for (a)
vertex v1, and (b) face t1.
3D sharing secret using Thian & Lin scheme
Blakley’s scheme produces shares of the same size as the original (secret) 3D model. How-
ever, Thian & Lin scheme produces shares 1/3 the size of the secret model. In the latter
scheme, we divide each vertex (resp. each face) into n shares, where each share is m × 1
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Share 1 Share n. . .
Figure 5.10: Thian & Lin secret sharing process: each share has two sub-shares m × 1
vertices array and × 1 faces array.
To split the faces matrix T , we use the vertex coordinates vi = {vix , viy , viz}, 1 ≤ i ≤
m , and the face values te = {tei , tej , tek}, 1 ≤ e ≤ l, as the coefﬁcients to the Eq.(5.4),
where t = 3. The main difference between Shamir’s scheme and Thian & Lin scheme is
that the coefﬁcients are not taken randomly. An important issue in the implementation of
secret sharing schemes is the size of the shares, since the security of a system lessens as the
amount of the information that must be kept secret increases. Unfortunately, in most secret
sharing schemes the size of the shares cannot be less than the size of the secret. There-
fore, to reduce the share size, we compress the 3D models using lossless data compression
methods such as Huffman coding [85] or ZLIB [86] before applying the secret sharing
schemes. Besides, compression prior to secret sharing helps remove redundancies and pat-
terns that might facilitate cryptanalysis. ZLIB is lossless data compression library that uses
a compression algorithm called Deﬂate. This lossless data compression algorithm uses a
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3D Object Vertices Faces Size (in bytes)
F15 5401 9665 176.55 KB
Tank 8659 18474 317.96 KB
Engine 2378 4562 81.32 KB
Table 5.2: Sizes of different 3D objects in bytes (Single precession)




F15 176.55 KB 150.56 KB 85.2 % 98.38 KB 55.7 %
Tank 317.96 KB 271.15 KB 85.2 % 143.90 KB 45.2 %
Engine 81.32 KB 66.88 KB 82.2 % 23.12 KB 28.4 %
Table 5.3: Compression results of 3D objects using Huffman coding and ZLIB algorithm.
combination of LZ77 algorithm and Huffman coding, and provides good compression on
a wide variety of data with minimal use of system resources. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the
original and compressed sizes of different 3D models.
5.3.3 Experimental results
We applied the (3, 4)-Blakley scheme on two 3D models: F15 ﬁghter jet and tank. The 3D
F15 model consists of 5401 vertices and 9665 faces, whereas the 3D tank model consists
of 8659 vertices and 18474 faces. All the share models have the same number of vertices
and faces. If the number of vertices is not a prime number, then we may duplicate the last
vertex until we reach the next prime number greater than the number of vertices. For F15
and tank models, we used the prime numbers pT = 5407 and pT = 8663, respectively.
From Figures 5.11 and 5.12, it is clear that the four generated shares of both models are
unrecognizable, indicating that the secret property is satisﬁed. Combining any 3 shares
from Figures 5.11(b)-(e) (resp. Figures 5.12(b)-(e)), we can reconstruct the original secret
model as shown in Figure 5.11(f) (resp. Figure 5.12(f)). Therefore, the lost of one share
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 5.11: (3, 4)-Blakley secret sharing process for the 3D F15 model: (a) original
model, (b)-(e) the four split shares, (f) reconstructed model using any 3 shares.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 5.12: (3, 4)-Blakley secret sharing process for the 3D tank model: (a) original
model, (b)-(e) the four split shares, (f) reconstructed model using any 3 shares.
will not prevent recovery of the model. These results are in fact consistent with numerous
3D models used for experimentation.
To further decrease the amount of the information that must be kept secret and reduce
the overhead calculations of the sharing process, we compress the 3D models before ap-
plying the secret sharing schemes. Table 5.4 shows the comparison between the sizes of
the shares generated by Blakely and Thian & Lin schemes using Huffman coding [85] or
ZLIB [86].
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3D Model Blakely Scheme
Share Size
Thian & Lin Scheme
Share Size
Uncompressed Huffman ZLIB Uncompressed Huffman ZLIB
F15 176.55 KB 150.56 KB 98.38 KB 58.85 KB 50.18 KB 32.79 KB
Tank 317.96 KB 271.15 KB 143.90 KB 105.98 KB 90.38 KB 47.96 KB
Engine 81.32 KB 66.88 KB 23.12 KB 27.1 KB 22.29 KB 7.7 KB
Table 5.4: Comparison between the sizes of the shares generated by Blakely and Thian &
Lin schemes using using Huffman coding and ZLIB compression algorithms.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Future Research
Directions
This chapter brieﬂy concludes the thesis and highlights the major contributions of this
research.
This thesis systematically studied various aspects of cryptography starting from the
primitive components (such as Boolean functions) to cryptographic applications that de-
liver a secure multimedia contents.
In the next section, the contributions made in each of the previous chapters and the
concluding results drawn from the associated research work are presented. Suggestions for
future research directions related to this thesis are provided in Section 6.2.
6.1 Thesis contributions
6.1.1 Properties of cryptographic functions
In chapter 2, we ﬁrst introduced the concept of nonlinearity-proﬁle for cryptographic Boolean
function. This newmeasure can be used to evaluate the strength of a Boolean function when
we ﬁx a subset of its input coordinates. The results in this section can be extended to other
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cryptographic criteria. In the second part of the chapter, we investigated the existence of
linear structures in rotation symmetric Boolean functions. The obtained results can help
the researchers to identify and choose appropriate functions to be used in their desired
cryptographic algorithms. At the end of the chapter, we generalized some of the previous
results on cryptographic Boolean functions to functions deﬁned over GF (p). Finally, we
presented a method to construct bent functions from semi-bent functions over GF (p).
6.1.2 Cryptanalysis of a public key cryptosystems based on Boolean
permutations
In chapter 3, we showed the public key cryptosystem (PKC2) proposed by Wu and Varad-
harajan [53] is insecure. In particular, when a linear function is used to initialize the algo-
rithm used to construct the Boolean permutation employed in this system, the cryptanalyst
can recover the plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext by solving a set of equations
over GF (2) using the known public key.
6.1.3 Image encryption schemes based on parameterized discrete trans-
forms
In chapter 4, we showed that previously proposed image encryption algorithms based on
discrete transforms represent typical examples of insecure ciphers due to their inherent
linearity. A careful analysis of the performance of these algorithms also reveals their in-
efﬁciency in terms of both bandwidth and throughput. For practical applications requiring
block ciphers, we recommend the use of the AES algorithm. Similarly, for applications
requiring stream ciphers, we recommend the use of one of the seven stream ciphers rec-
ommended by the European ECRYPT stream cipher project, in the eSTREAM Portfo-
lio. These algorithms have undergone extensive cryptanalytic reviews by the cryptographic
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community and are optimized to achieve an excellent tradeoff between security and perfor-
mance.
6.1.4 Secret sharing schemes for images and 3D models
In chapter 5, we showed that the matrix-based secret sharing scheme for 2D images pro-
posed by by M. Rey [82] is not ideal for practical usage. Any participant in the scheme
can recover the original image without the need to combine his share with any other partic-
ipant. We also proposed in the chapter a geometric framework for 3D secret sharing. The
proposed algorithms were motivated by Blakley and Thien and Lin secret sharing schemes.
To increase the security of the schemes by decreasing the amount of the information that
must be kept secret, we used two lossless data compression algorithms. Our experimental
results on several 3D models indicate the feasibility of the proposed approaches.
6.2 Future research directions
Several interesting research directions motivated by this thesis are discussed next. In ad-
dition to constructing and analyzing the cryptographic Boolean functions and their gener-
alization over different ﬁnite ﬁelds, we intend to accomplish the following projects in the
near future:
6.2.1 Cryptographic Boolean functions
Exploring the applications of off-the-shelf SAT solvers as tools to answer some of the
interesting open problems in designing Boolean functions. For instance, the construction
of (8,−,−, 118) boolean functions and studying the nonexistence of homogeneous bent
RSBFs conjectured in [6].
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6.2.2 Image encryption
Another future work direction is to investigate the use of a self-adaptive search optimiza-
tion techniques such as Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) in automated cryptanalysis of
image encryption schemes based on parameterized discrete transforms. The preliminarily
results showed that ﬁne tuning the sensitive parameters of the PSO algorithm can partly
reveal the original images. It is also interesting to further explore partial or selective en-
cryption mechanisms for digital images and 3D models as they reduce the amount of data
to encrypt while preserving a sufﬁcient level of security.
6.2.3 Secret sharing schemes for 3D models
Another possible future research direction is the use of mesh compression techniques such
as spectral mesh compression for 3D secret sharing. The key idea is to apply eigen-
decomposition to the mesh matrix, and then discard the largest eigenvalues/eigenvectors
in order to reduce the dimensionality of the new spectral basis so that most of the energy
is concentrated in the low frequency coefﬁcients. The advantage of incorporating mesh
compression techniques for 3D secret sharing is mainly due to the large reduction of the
resulting 3D model shares.
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